Systemic Drivers of Global Europe: How changes in the international political economy caused fundamental shifts in EU Trade Policy by Woodall, Marc
1 
 
 
Standardforside til projekter og specialer 
Til obligatorisk brug på alle projekter og specialer på: 
 Internationale udviklingsstudier 
• Global Studies 
• Erasmus Mundus, Global Studies – A European Perspective 
• Offentlig Administration 
• Socialvidenskab 
• EU-studies 
• Scient. Adm.(Lang Forvaltning) 
 
Udfyldningsvejledning på næste side. 
Projekt- eller specialetitel:  
Systemic Drivers of Global Europe: How changes in the international political economy caused 
fundamental shifts in EU Trade Policy   
Projektseminar/værkstedsseminar: 
 
Udarbejdet af (Navn(e) og studienr.): Projektets art: Modul: 
Marc Woodall 36317 Speciale GS-K2 
Vejleders navn:  
Lindsay Whitfield 
Afleveringsdato:  
9 April 2013 
Antal normalsider: 
75 
Tilladte normalsider jvt. de udfyldende bestemmelser:  
80 
2 
 
  
3 
 
Abstract 
This thesis uses supplementing theories from International Political Economy, Power Theory 
and Regionalism to explain how changes in the EU’s external environment motivated it to 
alter its trade policy as seen in its latest trade strategy, Global Europe. These external changes 
are known as systemic drivers, the most significant of which being: the changing economic 
geography of global production, the increasing influence of emerging powers in global 
governance and a more aggressive U.S. trade policy. In order to protect and promote its 
economic interests, the EU has decided to react to these drivers by changing its trade policy in 
a number of significant ways. It no longer provides non-reciprocal trade preferences to its 
former colonies, it uses bilateral trade negotiations as its main trade policy tool, it has 
increased its focus on East Asia, and all trading agreements now pursue the same goals of 
extensive liberalization of services markets and strengthened protection for European 
investors and intellectual property. 
These changes are implemented in order for the EU to maintain its dominant position in the 
global economy in the face of increasing competition for power and markets from new 
emerging economies and the U.S. By securing preferential conditions for its business in all its 
trading agreements, the EU hopes to secure not only market access, but the spread of 
regulatory frameworks which give European businesses preferential conditions and provide 
them with first mover privileges that can be used to secure a position of comparative 
advantage in the global economy.  
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1. Introduction 
The Problem 
The problem that this thesis will provide answers to is: Why has the European Union 
significantly shifted the strategic focus of its trade policy as evidenced in the Global Europe trade 
strategy.  
In 2006 the European Union (EU) launched a new trade strategy called Global Europe, the 
point of which was to elaborate how trade could contribute to growth and jobs in Europe, 
while also setting out a number of ways in which the EU had to break with past practices in 
order to achieve these goals. It was recognized that the EU lacked a foothold in dynamic 
growth markets in Asia, and underlined the need to focus on reducing non-tariff barriers in 
these markets. New areas of growth for the EU economy were identified, central among them 
being the protection of investment and intellectual property along with the opening of foreign 
markets for European services providers. Though support is given to the World Trade 
Organization (WTO), the EU breaks with tradition by underlining the need to use free trade 
agreements to achieve its goals, despite the risk they pose to a unified multilateral trade 
system.  
The EU has historically focused its trade policy either on negotiations at the World Trade 
Organization or on unilateral preference schemes for developing countries. But changes in the 
international economy, especially since the middle of the 1990s, drove the EU to reevaluate its 
strategies. Non-reciprocal trade preferences to former colonies were abandoned and replaced 
by reciprocal free trade agreements called Economic Partnership Agreements. The EU also 
started pursuing free trade agreements in Latin America and East Asia, despite promoting 
itself as one of the staunchest defenders of multilateralism just a few years earlier. 
Furthermore, its new competitiveness-driven free trade agreements do not differentiate 
between developing and developed countries, showing that the EUs pursuit of growth and 
jobs via the opening of foreign markets, now takes clear precedence over development 
concerns. 
It is the purpose of this thesis to explain why these changes happened.  
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Methodology 
This thesis takes a global political economy perspective which entails a role for the state in 
shaping markets. Economic factors are accepted as playing an important role in determining 
the shape and direction of the global political economy, but political factors have  even greater 
importance. The global economy is therefore strongly shaped by the political interests, and 
relations, of the major economic powers, including the US, the European Union and China 
(Gilpin, 2001: 12). This view rejects the position that economic and technological forces have 
created a global economy in which governments and states are no longer important. This 
thesis applies, and thereby also supports, the view that governments use their power to 
implement policies that effect global economic forces in way that is in their interest. The 
global economy is therefore not shaped by market forces alone, but also by the policies of 
especially the most powerful actors, as they define the rules that other political and economic 
actors follow.   
Power relations between the largest actors are of central concern to understanding the 
functioning of the global economy, and this thesis shows that, when it comes to trade policy, 
economic power is central1. The ability of an actor to understand and navigate international 
power relationships has a direct influence on the not only the geographic focus of its trade 
policy, but also the thematic content of trade negotiations as well as the forums that are 
chosen to conduct these negotiations. If the EU’s trade policy is to be understood it is 
therefore necessary to focus on economic power, and especially the ability of actors to convert 
their resources in to actual power by leveraging access to their domestic markets and 
changing negotiating forums.  
The majority of work on the trade policy of the European Union focuses on the importance of 
domestic dynamics, whether it is the institutional environment (See Pilegaard, 2007; Meunier, 
2005; Meunier & Nicolaidis, 2006) or the influence of interest groups (see Siles-Brugge, 
2012).  However, the fact that EU trade policy has changed in recent years, without significant 
changes in these domestic dynamics, means that these are not able to sufficiently explain this 
change. As this thesis shows, systemic drivers found in the external environment must 
therefore be responsible. To understand these elements, a realist approach is applied, where 
the EU is understood as a rational and unitary actor.  Focus is therefore placed on the geo-
                                                        
1 As opposed to military power or psychological power 
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economic and mercantilist considerations that underlie EU trade policy and therefore help 
explain the EU’s competitive pursuit of preferential positions in foreign markets (Zimmerman, 
2007: 813: Sbragia, 2010: 368; Aggarwal & Fogharty, 2004). 
The distinction between domestic and systemic influences refers back to three levels of 
analysis first formulated by Kenneth Waltz (1959), called the first, second and third image 
explanations. The first image explanations focus on the ideological basis for decisions and how 
these are influenced by changing ideas or mental frameworks, while the second image focuses 
on the influence of institutions and domestic interests. The last category, third image 
explanations, looks outwards and attempts to understand how changes in the global political 
economy cause an actor to respond by changing strategy. This thesis adopts an analytical 
framework which emphasizes the third image explanations. This choice is made because the 
variables determining the first and second image explanation remained relatively constant 
despite changes in the EU’s trade strategy. On the other hand major changes in systemic 
drivers coincide with not only changes in the thematic focus of EU trade policy, but also its 
sequencing, timing and geographic focus.  
The relationship between the EU and the US is central to understanding the behavior of the 
EU. As this thesis shows, the regulation of global trade is one way in which this relationship 
manifests itself. The EU and the US have historically pursued similar strategies with regard to 
regulating global trade, both in terms of geographic focus and thematic content. It is therefore 
necessary to incorporate in the theoretical framework, concepts which can explain why these 
two global trade powers either cooperate or compete in the realm of global trade governance. 
Competitive Regionalism provides such a framework. It not only focuses on the central 
competitive aspect of the many free trade agreements being conducted in recent years, but 
also explains the legal, political and economic motivations behind the content of the 
agreements as well as their sequencing. It therefore also circumvents the usual pitfalls of 
other theories of regionalism which fail to explain why trade agreements are negotiated 
despite limited economic benefits and which therefore cannot be used to explain the EU’s free 
trade negotiations with smaller economies (see Mansfield & Soningen, 2010).  
Because of the nature of the European Union, with its different rules for separate policy areas, 
it is necessary to underline that it is specifically with regards to trade policy, and not foreign 
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policy in general, towards which the realist approach applied her is helpful. This is due to the 
significant amount of political centralization which defines EU trade policy. Nearly all of the 
strategic analysis, political initiative and implementation of a wide range of issues relevant to 
trade policy is centered around the European Commission, and therefore allows it to act as a 
traditional state, facilitating the use of a realist approach. This is not the case in the rest of the 
EU’s foreign policy, which is more centered on the actions and priorities of the EU’s Member 
States.  
An important delineation in this thesis is between interest formation and interest protection 
and promotion. This thesis focuses on how the EU promotes and protects its interests in 
reaction to challenges it faces in the global economy. It is therefore not focused on how these 
interests come about, and regards these instead as constant, or exogenous. This allows for a 
discussion to focus on constraints and incentives on government behavior which come from 
the external international system (Cohen, 1990: 269).  
 The study of interest formation in the EU is covered extensively by other authors, especially 
Moravcsik (1998), whose work on liberal intergovernmentalism is fundamental to 
understanding the way EU interests are created. He explains how the balance of economic 
interests at the national level determine Member States preferences and how these are then 
aggregated at the European Union level, specifically within the Council of Ministers.  An 
elaboration of this work can be found in Wallace et.al (2005) and more recently in Siles-
Brügge (2012). It is an underlying assumption of this thesis that this process plays a central 
part  in helping the European Commission define its priorities, which it sets about to protect 
and promote by reacting in a specific way to the challenges presented by shifts in the global 
political economy.  Interest formation will therefore not be analyzed further.  
Data and Sources 
To understand how systemic drivers influence EU trade policy, three different sets of 
information are needed. The first set is concerned with obtaining an understanding of 
historical events relating to EU trade policy and the way it has been conducted in the past. 
This thesis uses a mixture of primary and secondary documents to achieve this 
understanding. Official documents from the European Commission, obtained via its official 
website, function as primary sources and give an insight into the Commissions understanding 
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of events as they unfolded as well as the information and data on which it based this 
understanding. It presents this information in official strategy papers, working documents, 
political agreements, communications and press releases. These documents provide first hand 
information on how the EU defines its interests, and therefore also provides the basis for 
understanding how the European Commission understands the goals it is attempting to 
promote via its trade policy.   
But using the European Commission alone does not provide information on the whole range 
of events covered in this thesis, nor provide a credible version of those events that it does 
analyze, given its role as a party to the events. Secondary sources, in the form of scholarly 
analysis conducted after the events have transpired, therefore play an important part. They 
provide a range of perspectives and data on the events in question, and therefore allow for an 
aggregation of information which may provide a credible understanding of the events that 
have transpired and which may be representative of a wider array of interests.  By using 
several different sources that provide accounts of the same historical events, the inherent bias 
in each individual source is minimized.  This also helps avoid relying too heavily on official 
documents and therefore obtaining a version of events that too heavily reflects the ideological 
preconceptions of the institutions being analyzed.   
The second set of information needed is concerned with understanding the changes in the 
global political economy which represent systemic drivers of EU trade policy. Primary sources 
here include official statistics from international agencies such as the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development and the World Trade Organization, but also the 
European Commission, the Danish Foreign Ministry and the United States Trade 
Representative. These sources often provide quantitative information on trade and 
investment flows as well as economic statistics central to understanding the changing 
geography of global production. Because the statistics are often supplied by actors or 
institutions which are an active party to the transpiring events being analyzed, secondary 
sources, in the form of analytical work by scholars in political and economic books and 
journals, provide much needed alternative perspectives on how this data can be understood 
and applied to the relevant context. As the relationship between the developed and 
developing world is central to this thesis it has also been attempted to find sources that 
themselves originate in the developing countries involved. This is done in an attempt to avoid 
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a “western” bias when looking at matters of international political economy and the 
importance of specific shifts in power from West to East.  
The third and final set of information needed focuses on the EUs recent actions in carrying out 
its trade policy. Because many of the events analyzed have recently transpired or are 
conducted in closed settings, this limits not only the amount of information available, but also 
the diversity of the sources themselves. To understand the EUs recent trade behavior it is 
therefore necessary to rely on leaked negotiating mandates and directives found on internet 
portals and economic commentary websites. The authenticity of these documents have 
proven difficult to ascertain, but the fact that the information provided seems to fit with news 
emanating from transpiring events, as well as with official documents, speak to their veracity. 
Furthermore, as many negotiations are ongoing, the amount of scholars that have been able to 
analyze the agreements is also limited, meaning there are fewer alternative perspectives of 
events, which can be used as secondary sources. This can specifically effect information on the 
current state of affairs of negotiations, as the only available source of information here is the 
European Commission, which is itself a biased party to these negotiations and has an interest 
in promoting a certain version of events. Information provided by the Commission on issues 
such as which side is providing obstacles in the negotiations, is therefore never taken at face 
value, but understood in the wider context of how the EU is using negotiations to achieve its 
goals.      
The Argument 
This thesis will use the presented methodological framework to understand strategic shifts in 
the EUs trade policy. It will focus on two sets of systemic drivers in the global political 
economic system to which the EU responded by changing its trade policy. The first set of 
systemic drivers is concerned with changes in the geography of global production and what 
this has meant for the role of emerging Asian powers in global economic governance. From 
the 1990s and onwards jobs, growth and investment have increasingly flowed towards 
mainland Asia, causing the rise of the Asian Drivers, mainly India and China.  
Because of their growth, market potential and increasingly central role in global production 
networks, these countries have gained increased importance in the governance of global 
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trade, and it has therefore become necessary for the EU to respond to these changes in order 
to protect and promote those sectors that provide a majority of the EUs value added in the 
global economy and therefore represent the EUs comparative advantage. For the EU, this 
advantage is mainly concerned with liberalizing services markets and protecting intellectual 
property and investment. The services sector constitutes around 77% of EU GDP and it 
therefore perceives it as a key sector in creating the connection between domestic job 
creation and foreign market opening, while the protection of intellectual property is seen by 
the EU as a central component in maintaining an advantage over emerging economies with 
lower resource and labor costs 
The second set of drivers is the action of the EU’s main competitor in global trade, the United 
States (US). Around the turn of the 21st century the US effectively abandoned its support for 
WTO trade rounds and started pursuing its interests bilaterally instead. This constituted a 
threat to the EUs economy. If the US succeeded in getting access to new emerging markets and 
implementing its version of regulatory reform in those countries, then this could pose a 
serious risk to the possibilities of European business in these markets. This was especially the 
case for the services industry as profitability in these sectors is very dependent on friendly 
government regulation. If the US succeeded in implementing regulations that 
disproportionately benefitted their own companies over the EU’s, then that could damage 
economic growth in the EU. The EU therefore needed to secure either comparative advantages 
for its own business through regulatory reform, or at least obtain conditions similar to those 
provided to the US.  
Central to understanding how the EU conducts itself in the arena of international trade policy 
is the question of power. Trade negotiations are an exercise in extracting concessions from 
other parties without succumbing to the same pressures. The degree of power in the 
relationship between the negotiating parties is therefore central to understanding the 
outcomes of negotiations. The wider the asymmetries of power the more unequal the result, 
and thereby also a more beneficial agreement to the prevailing party. As the EU is the largest 
trading block in the world, it should be able to extract large concessions from partners, if it 
can convert its economic resources into power. It was able to do this for many years in the 
WTO, where the EU and the US dictated negotiations due to their ability to utilize their 
dominant positions in the global economy. With the increasing ability of several emerging and 
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developing economies to convert their own resources into power at the WTO, the EU and the 
US were no longer able to use WTO negotiations to achieve their own goals. They therefore 
sought to regulate trade via forums where they could more effectively convert their large 
market resources in to power asymmetries, which in turn could be used to achieve 
concessions in negotiations.  
They therefore turned to regional and bilateral trade negotiations. Here the EU negotiated 
individually with small economies which, because of their economic dependence on the EU, 
offered extensive concessions in return for access to the large EU market. Seeing as the 
emerging countries grouped together at the WTO to improve their negotiating position, the 
EU and the US chose to circumvent this problem by negotiating bilaterally instead. Here they 
could divide the emerging and developing country block in to individual parts and negotiate 
with them separately, ensuring a situation with wide power asymmetries which allowed them 
to gain more control over negotiations.    
Thesis Structure  
This thesis will be structured as follows. Chapter two will provide the theoretical framework. 
The framework itself is based on a number of theories founded in International Political 
Economy, Regionalism and Power Theory, and will elaborate central terms that will be used in 
the later analysis. Chapter three will focus on a presenting a historical overview of the EUs 
trade policy, with a central focus on its trading arrangement with the African, Caribbean and 
Pacific countries (ACP) and its role at the WTO. To understand the changes that the EU has 
conducted in its trade policy in recent years, it is necessary to understand the EUs trade 
history so as to appreciate the degree of those changes. Chapter four will focus on the 
systemic drivers which have been a central cause of the EUs changes in trade policy. Here 
shifts in the geography of global production will be explained as will their influence on the 
role of emerging economies in global trade governance. Also, this chapter will focus on the 
trade policy of the US. As the US is the EU’s main competitor in global trade, the EU must 
constantly orient itself according to the US to ensure its comparative advantages. Chapter five 
will elaborate how the EU has reacted to these drivers by negotiating Economic Partnership 
Agreements with the ACP. It will be explained how the EU’s pursuit of foreign markets for its 
domestic industries, as well as obstacles at the WTO,  led it to include investment, services and 
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Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) provisions in its free trade agreements with the ACP 
countries. Chapter six will present an analysis of the EU’s new Global Europe trade agreements 
in Latin America and East Asia and show how the EU is reacting to the systemic drivers 
presented previously by engaging in a race with the US to gain access to new dynamic markets 
and to implement regulatory frameworks in those markets which provide advantages to 
European businesses. Finally, a concluding chapter will summarize the findings and provide a 
perspective on their importance for analyzing the role of the EU in the global political 
economy.   
  
16 
 
2. Theory 
Introduction 
This thesis will rely on a theoretical framework developed from a mixture of different 
complementary theories, each of which will illuminate separate mechanisms concerning the 
EU’s trade policy. When put together in a common framework they will provide an 
encompassing explanation of the different elements in the global economy which influence 
the EU’s formulation and implementation of trade policy.  
Central to understanding the actions of the EU, is a theoretical understanding of the 
international system and the role of states within that system. Gilpins (2001) explanation of 
state centric realism provides such an understanding. It also provides the basis for using the a 
theoretical framework provided by Stephen Woolcock (2012), which builds on the three 
image explanations derived from Kenneth Waltz (1959) presented in the Introduction chapter 
and elaborates them to be specifically relevant to EU trade policy. Woolcock (2012) argues 
that there are eight drivers which constitute the main influences on EU trade policy: relative 
economic or market power, recognition, systemic factors, member state interests, sector 
interests, normative power, institutional factors and formal competence.  Many of these 
drivers are domestic, and as explained in the previous chapter, these cannot sufficiently 
explain developments in EU trade policy, and so will not be elaborated here. It is instead 
necessary to look at which drivers can illuminate the most important external factors and 
then concentrate on these.  Out of the eight, two have an external focus: relative economic and 
market power and systemic factors, and the importance of these two issues will therefore be 
the central focus of this thesis.   
One of the main tools in the trade policy toolbox is free trade agreements, and it is therefore 
necessary to gain an understanding of how and why they are used. To achieve this, different 
aspects of the theoretical work on regionalism will be incorporated in the framework 
presented here. Regionalism is essentially the study of political and economic relationships 
within and across regions, and is therefore also a study of the background and motivation for 
free trade agreements. Theoretical work on regionalism by Baldwin (2011), Solis & Kotada 
(2009), Nakagawa (2009), Urata (2009) and Aggarwal & Fogarty (2003) provides insights 
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into the motivations behind the use of free trade agreements in trade policy, and the 
contribution of regionalism to the theoretical framework presented here will mainly be drawn 
from these sources.  
Finally, understanding the role of power in international political economy will be central to 
analyzing the behavior of the EU. The theoretical work on power by Joseph Nye (2011) will 
help illuminate why understanding the relative and relational nature of power, as well as the 
importance of controlling agendas and converting resources into influence, are central 
determinants of EU trade policy.  
Systemic Drivers and State Centric Realism 
Systemic drivers2, or factors as Woolcock (2012) calls them, are those pressures or demands 
on a specific actor which motivate that actor to behave in a specific manner. They provide 
either incentives or constraints, and often take the form of changes in relations and structures 
that constitute the international economic and political system.  Systemic drivers constitute 
one of the central factors determining EU trade policy and so it is necessary to elaborate a 
number of theoretical interpretations which make the use of them as analytical tools possible.   
The choice of focusing on systemic drivers is based in the idea that a unitary state actor can 
react to inputs from the international system. It is therefore built on a theoretic interpretation 
called state centered realism, which accepts the importance of other actors, such as firms and 
international institutions, but sees the states as the central actors in international affairs. As 
mentioned in the Introduction, though the EU is not a state, it does act like one in the specific 
area of trade policy. The fact that the EU is a unitary actor allows it to react to what it 
perceives as external influences, an action that would not be possible had EU trade policy 
instead been an agglomeration of separate Member State and institutional preferences.  
Once this is accepted, it becomes possible to look past the domestic dynamics as the central 
determinants of EU trade policy, and instead focus on the systemic drivers that influence EU 
behavior. Prioritizing the analysis of systemic rather than domestic issues is empirically 
                                                        
2 The term systemic drivers will be used throughout this thesis but is interchangeable with Stephan Woolcock’s 
term systemic factors. This is because the term systemic drivers has been more extensively explained in the 
International Political Economy literature, and it is used here to recognize that it is this body of academic work it 
is taken from.  
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supported by the fact that EU trade policy has changed dramatically in recent years despite 
there having been no major changes in the domestic environment of the Union3.  On the other 
hand major political and economic changes in the global political economy have occurred in 
the same period, which therefore leads to the conclusion that they have significant 
importance. A central element of state centric realism is the importance of being constantly 
aware of shifts in the international balance of power, especially as a result of geographic 
changes in the economic basis of the international political system, and so leads theoretical 
support to the centrality of systemic elements to the formulation and implementation of trade 
policy (Gilpin, 2001: 22).   
Having understood the importance of looking at changes in the international system, it is 
important to understand how actors react to these changes.  One of the ways trade policy is 
used to react to systemic drivers is through the use of free trade agreements. It is therefore 
necessary to look at the theoretical foundations which underlie their usage.  
Regionalism 
To understand the EUs trade policy, and specifically the way in which it uses free trade 
agreements, it is helpful to look at theories under the umbrella of Regionalism. These focus on 
the motivations behind, and the benefits of, free trade agreements and so can provide insight 
in to why the EU uses them as a central tool in its trade policy.  
First of all it is necessary to understand the background of the political debate regarding 
regionalism. There is often debate regarding the meaning of regionalism and its relation to a 
similar but different process: regionalization4. The term regionalism is used to designate a 
political process of coordination, while regionalization is used to describe the process of trade 
within a region growing more than that regions trade with the outside world. This can also be 
called an increase in intra-region trade. In this way the two terms respectively denote a top-
down interstate process, and a bottom-up process driven by societal and economic forces. 
Inherent in the latter is the idea that economic developments is driven by private actors and 
functions independently of political direction. As explained in the methodology section in the 
                                                        
3 The ratification of the Lisbon Treaty is accepted as a large change in the domestic system, but it did not happen 
until 2009 after many of the strategic changes to EU trade policy had already taken place. The Lisbon Treaty has 
furthermore not significantly changed the strategic focus or implementation of the EU’s trade policy.  
4 Mansfield & Solingen (2010) provide an extensive and referenced summation of this debate.  
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Introduction chapter, the state-centered realism approach used in this thesis rejects this idea 
on the basis that political actors, especially states, create rules, frameworks and institutions 
that direct economic progress, and economic development is therefore not a variable that 
changes independently of political action. Instead regionalism, meaning the political actions 
that direct economic integration, will be the theoretical focal point here as the actions of 
states is seen as the central determinant of developments in the international economy. After 
acknowledging that states shape the global economy, the next step is to understand how they 
do this. One of the most widely used tools is the negotiation of free trade agreements and 
central to understanding trade policy in a regionalism framework is therefore understanding 
the way these are used by political entities attempting to change the structures of global trade 
to their advantage.  
Free trade agreements can differ widely from each other in matters of scope, level of 
commitment, depth of coverage and so on. There can therefore be no general judgment on the 
effects or consequences of free trade agreements. Nevertheless there are some things that can 
be said about what free trade agreements are used for. 
First and foremost, all free trade agreements are exclusionary. They provide benefits to 
certain partners thereby discriminating against others. Business and governments can 
therefore use these agreements to gain preferences and advantages in areas such as tariff and 
investment liberalization, harmonization of standards, coordination of competition policy, 
elimination of non-tariff barriers, Rules of Origin and more.   
It is often assumed that economic expansion is the main reason for engaging in free trade 
negotiations, but this is not the only reason (See Mansfield &Solingen, 2010). Though tariff 
reductions and market access for goods are important motivations for engaging in free trade 
negotiations, many free trade agreements cover low volumes of trade and investment, create 
a confusing myriad  of Rules of Origin and create preferences that are underutilized by 
business. So there must be other motivations as well. One of these is the domino effect 
(Baldwin, 1993: Sbragia, 2010).  
The domino effect refers to the desire of countries to even out perceived disadvantages of 
being left out of trade agreements, even though it is uncertain whether those disadvantages 
will actually be realized. When a country signs a free trade agreement with a partner, its 
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competitors will fear this will disadvantage them. This creates a chain reaction where more 
and more countries want to sign a free trade agreement to avoid the risk associated with 
being left out (Urata, 2009). If the US gets preferential access to a certain market which 
disadvantages the EU, then the EU will want to change that disadvantage by getting a free 
trade agreement with the same market. The competitors of the foreign market will also want 
agreements with both the EU and the US, and so on.  
This race to achieve access to new markets is called competitive regionalism i.e.  
“the competition between different jurisdictions which seek strategic advantages 
for themselves through the conclusion of bilateral agreements with key trading 
partners” (Koopman & Wilhelm, 2008: 305) 
This competitive aspect of regionalism goes beyond gaining access to markets for goods, and 
cannot simply be understood as a question of reducing tariffs. For the EU and the US, being 
able to define regulatory frameworks especially in the services sector, is of utmost 
importance. Specifically in the services sector, there are advantages to being a standard setter 
or first-mover (Nakagawa, 2009), meaning there are discriminatory advantages to be had by 
the first country that is able to get foreign markets to implement a certain set of domestic 
regulations This is called legal competition and is a central aspect of explaining the spread of 
free trade agreements (Solis & Katada, 2009: 21).  Governments also compete to have their 
standards or rules incorporated in as many agreements as possible, as this increases the 
probability that their rules and standards may later be incorporated at the international or 
global level. States may therefore pursue spreading their regulatory framework to a number 
of smaller countries before negotiating with larger emerging economies, in the hope that the 
spread of a certain framework to a wide range of countries will pressure emerging economies 
to apply the same frameworks for the sake of convenience. This is called regulatory encircling 
and is a central concept when attempting to understand why large economies engage in trade 
negotiations with smaller, seemingly unimportant, foreign markets with limited economic 
potential (Baldwin, 2011).   
It is often the more powerful economies that impose their regulatory framework on others, as 
a dominant position in negotiations is needed to impose such invasive reforms. This is 
another reason why large economies often chose to negotiate with smaller countries, despite 
small economic prospects. The asymmetries are large and there are clear relationships of 
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dependence giving the larger party power over the smaller. The larger party may therefore 
not gain much in way of trade creation, because of the economic size of the other party, but 
will alternatively gain a large amount of control over negotiations. Smaller parties may often 
agree to a wide range of changes to national systems of standards, rules and regulations, 
simply to ensure access to a large market.  
These dynamics underline that issues of power are central to both the choice of negotiating 
partner, the forum where negotiations are conducted as well as the scope and depth of 
agreements. Understanding how power is constituted and used in trade policy is therefore 
central to understanding why the EU chooses to act as it does in reaction to systemic drivers.  
Power 
In a political economy context, power can be understood as the ability of actors to use political 
institutions to achieve the outcomes that they deem best. Power is both relational, meaning it 
is created in an interaction with other actors, and relative, meaning that it is the differences, 
between, not the solitary value of, opposing parties’ resources along with their ability to 
convert these into influence, that determine power. To analyze power, it is therefore not 
enough to solely look at the resources, or properties, of one actor, but to see how these 
compare to the resources of others.  
According to Woolcock (2012), relative economic power refers to how differences in power 
resources and their conversion affect how effective an actor will be in international 
negotiations. In trade policy some of the most important resources of power are related to 
economic size and developmental progress. So size and quality of GDP along with levels of 
technology, human and natural resources as well as political and legal institutions are central 
to economic power, but do not independently create power. The degree to which other 
countries are dependent on access to these resources is central to determining a power 
relationship (Nye, 2011:54).  The level of mutual dependence, or symmetry, and the ability to 
manipulate the asymmetries of this dependence, can define the power that one actor has over 
the other. A trading relationship between a large and a small economy will often be 
asymmetrical as the smaller economy will probably be more dependent on the larger market 
than vice versa.   
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But this dependence must be managed. An actor may have larger resources, but the way in 
which it uses these resources determines its power. Getting from resources to outcomes is 
called power conversion, and as resources do not guarantee outcomes, it is the ability of an 
actor to manage this conversion effectively through an understanding of the present context 
and the application of appropriate strategy which determines actual power (Nye, 2011: 8). A 
central part of managing this conversion is understanding the relational aspects of power.  
Relational Power 
Power is relational as it occurs in the interaction between several parties. It can be divided in 
to three variants: commanding change, controlling agendas and establishing preferences 
(Nye, 2011: 11). The first variant is the ability to command others to behave in a way that was 
against their initial preferences, while the second refers to the ability to designate the 
framework within which power is determined, and thereby deciding which variables decide 
power. The final variant, the ability to establish preferences, refers to the ability to influence 
the manner in which others reach their preferences. 
This thesis will mainly focus on the first two variants. As this thesis shows, a central dynamic 
of EU trade policy is the EU’s ability to use asymmetrical power relationships to achieve its 
goals despite the opposing interests of other parties. Interests of others are not changed, but 
disregarded and so the third variant of power is not of central importance. The use of power 
to get others to act against their preferences, often by using a mixture of coercion and 
payments, is often on display during trade negotiations, and so this variant will be central to 
the understanding of power presented in this thesis (Nye, 2011: 16).  
The second variant, controlling agendas, focuses on the ability to control the framework 
within which others have to act. This entails being able to define the variables used to 
measure the power in a given forum.  This variant of power is specifically relevant in this 
thesis, as the ability to chose whether trade negotiations are conducted multilaterally or 
bilaterally, determines the nature  of the power relationships in question and therefore also 
the ability of actors to convert power resources into actual influence.  
The theoretical framework presented here provides analytical tools that can be used to 
understand the interrelationship between systemic drivers, power relationships and the role 
of free trade agreements in trade policy. Understanding these elements can not only help 
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identify which variables in the international political economy have a large influence on the 
EUs trade policy, but can also help explain why the EU reacts to these impulses in the way it 
does.  
To understand the changes that the EU has conducted in its trade policy it is necessary to first 
gain an understanding of what the EUs trade policy looked liked before it implemented the 
changes that we see today. The following chapter will therefore present a historical 
understanding of the EUs trade policy as it was conducted in two central forums: the World 
Trade Organisation, and in regional agreements with its former colonies in Africa, the 
Caribbean and the Pacific.   
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3. A History of EU Trade Policy 
Introduction 
This chapter will provide a historical overview of the EUs trade policy, focusing on principles 
that were previously central to the EU, but which it distances itself from in its new trade 
strategy, Global Europe as a reaction to systemic drivers. Historically, the EU was willing and 
able to simultaneously support multilateralism and use its position at the WTO to obtain 
waivers and exceptions for itself and for its developing partners in Africa, the Caribbean and 
the Pacific (ACP). This changed gradually over the years as the growing influence of emerging 
economies undermined the position of the EU at the WTO. This not only meant that the EU 
found it increasingly difficult to pursue its two main objectives: inducing liberalization abroad 
and maintaining protection at home, but also weakened its ability, and motivation, to use its 
position and political capital to obtain preferential agreements and exceptions for its 
developing partners in the ACP. This decline in influence at the WTO culminates with the 
functional breakdown of the Doha Development Round which serves as a final motivation for 
the EU to pursue its interests outside the multilateral system.  
Yaoundé to Lomé and the First GATT Rounds 
Initially, the EUs trade policy was created by the Treaty of Rome in 1956 and for the first 
many years, trade policy focused on negotiating tariff reductions with the US (Hoeller et.al, 
1998). The political focus of trade policy as defined by the Treaty of Rome was on pursuit of 
trade liberalization at a multilateral level. Here it was possible for the EU, together with other 
industrialized countries, to promote global liberalization programs in areas in which they 
were competitive, while still allowing them to protect less competitive, but politically 
sensitive sectors, like agriculture.  Along as this remained possible, the WTO was the EU’s 
favored negotiating forum (Pilegaard, 2005).  
The EU has since its inception had a special relationship with the developing world, especially 
the former colonies of its member states. This was illustrated already at the signing of the 
Treaty of Rome in 1957 which created the European Common Market. Here the first European 
Development Fund was created, providing a mechanism through which European countries 
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could transfer financial assistance to former African colonies (European Commission, 2012a). 
Since then successive cooperation agreements between the EU and the ACP states have set 
out the principles and objectives of cooperation between the two groups and have been 
supported by subsequent European Development Funds (European Commission, 2012b). 
Much of the trade policy conducted outside multilateral negotiations, and which was not 
focused on neighbors and future accessioning states, was conducted towards these former 
colonies and was encapsulated in the political cooperation agreements between the two 
groups.  
The first EU-ACP agreements were the two Yaoundé Conventions. From a trade perspective 
they are interesting as the EU was granted reverse preferences, meaning the former colonies 
gave the EU preferential trade access to their markets (Ravenhill, 2002: 2). The EU assumed 
this would make the agreement compliant with international trade rules5 ensuring that the 
legality of the agreement could not be challenged (Pilegaard, 2005: 148). Officially, free trade 
agreements have to live up to WTO/GATT rules to be legal, but these rules are often open to 
interpretation and members can apply for exemptions. The ability and willingness to navigate 
the international trade system in this way depends for the most part on the political 
relationships between the different actors at the WTO. These play a pivotal part in EU trade 
policy, and will be therefore be elaborated in the chapters on systemic drivers and the EUs 
reaction to these.  
 In the 1970s the Member States of the EU were very focused on promoting their own national 
industries. These actions had to be defended internationally so the EU focused its efforts at 
the GATT trade negotiations in Tokyo on protecting the Member States ability to use subsidies 
and regulations to favor national industries. It also continued its struggle to protect its 
agricultural support program from demands from the US for its liberalization (Woolcock, 
2012:48).  The increased focus on industrial nationalism was in part due to the fact that 
growth had slowed in the 70’s, and this had in turn caused member states to pursue non tariff 
barriers and subsidies to industries that would not have survived without government 
support (Hoeller et al, 1998: §7). The most important fact to note here is the willingness of the 
                                                        
5 GATT article XXIV sets down the rules for free trade agreements and customs unions. If an agreement does not 
comply with this article then the agreement is de jura illegal, though this does not necessarily mean it will not be 
implemented.  
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EU to pursue goals that did not centre around extensive liberalization as a means to achieving 
increased competitiveness and growth. The EU was very concerned with protecting Member 
State’s ability to conduct industrial policy. This is opposed to the position that it applies in its 
current trade strategy, where competition and liberalization, and not state intervention, is 
deemed the only viable option for achieving economic diversification A point that will be 
covered more in the chapter on the EU’s reaction to systemic drivers.  
The first Lomé Convention, signed in 1975, was a landmark in EU-ACP relations and” was 
unique in terms of the breadth, depth and institutional richness of its trade regime” (Stevens et 
al, 1998: v). With the accession of the UK to the EU in 1973 it was necessary to accommodate 
the arrangements that the British had with their former colonies. Furthermore, the reverse 
preferences that were an important part of trade relations under Yaoundé were regarded 
with criticism by others, including the US, which saw the agreements as undermining a 
multilateral trading system and disadvantaging US businesses (Ravenhill, 2002:3).  
In the mid 1970’s developing countries were becoming more assertive in the international 
political system, and with this came a larger voice in international relations. The G77 group of 
developing countries was formed and they started calling for a New International Economic 
Order,  which had non-reciprocity in trade relations as a central component. The oil crises in 
the 70’s underlined Europe’s dependence on foreign energy and raw materials, and with the 
Middle East and Latin America turning to other strategic partners like the US, the 
maintenance of a strong relationship with Africa became central to the EUs foreign trade 
policy (Makhan, 2009: 40).  
These changes in the global political economy changed the relationship between the EU and 
the ACP and the first Lomé Convention reflects this change. It introduced the principle of non-
reciprocal trade preferences, where the EU provided access to its large domestic market, 
without demanding the same preferential treatment from its partners in the ACP. This was a 
large political victory for the ACP and exemplifies the way international shifts in economic 
power manifest themselves in trade agreements (Ravenhill, 2002:3). But economic power can 
also shift back, as became evident for the ACP.  
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Though the Lomé Conventions gave preferential duty-free access to the EU market for 95% of 
ACP tariff lines as well as guaranteed above market prices for certain ACP exports6 via so 
called Commodity Protocols (Pilegaard, 2005: 149), these preferences gradually eroded over 
time as the EU expanded preferences to other trading partners (Stevens, 1998: 4). By 
expanding its unilateral trade preference scheme called the Generalized System of 
Preferences, lowering its Most Favored Nation tariffs and entering into trade agreements with 
other countries, the EU effectively undermined the beneficial position that it had provided for 
the ACP countries exports (Ravenhill, 2002: 7).  
Further limiting the ACPs export benefits, the EU used its  Common Agricultural Policy to 
protect its most sensitive agricultural products, thereby ensuring that the more competitive 
ACP exports were kept out of the EU market. Any ACP country trying to export these products 
to Europe would therefore be met by substantial barriers to trade (Pilegaard, 2005: 149). This 
problem was partially remedied by the mid-term review of Lomé, where the EU agreed to 
increased development aid and reducing further the preferential tariff rates that applied to 
the ACP (Hoeller, 1998: 82), but this was not enough to solve the problems facing the ACP 
with regards to economic growth and export diversification.  
Though the first Lomé Convention reflected a power relationship where the ACP had been 
able to obtain and use a position of power based on the EUs dependence on its natural 
resources, this situation was gradually eroded over time. The EU strengthened its position 
towards the ACP, due among other things to the economic crises in many developing 
countries during the 1980s, and the way this increased the economic dependence of the ACP 
on the EU as its major trading partner (Helleiner, 1983: 18-19).  The EU used this position to 
protect its own sensitive sectors to the detriment of ACP exports, but provided payment in the 
form of aid to ease the pain. Social and environmental clauses were also introduced, allowing 
the EU to indulge in implicit protectionism, without undermining its position at the WTO as a 
proponent of liberalization and free trade.   
                                                        
6 Beef, bananas, sugar and rum covering 9 % of ACP exports (Ravenhill, 2002) 
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Political and Economic Shifts Change EU Policy 
In the 1980’s to mid 1990’s the EU position on trade shifted away from protecting domestic 
industry as the creation of the common market helped it compete internationally, and 
resulted in a deepening of common regulations and rules  that “strengthened market power 
and the domestic basis for common external positions” (Woolcock, 2012:49). The integration of 
the domestic market helped strengthen the position of European business internationally, and 
so the need for the EU to indulge in varying degrees of implicit protectionism in its 
international trade negotiations disappeared along with it.  
In the EU, the free movement of goods furthered the liberalization of Member State trade 
policies, as Member State protectionism was undermined by non-tariff barrier rules made at 
the European level. This, along with a need to keep the US engaged in multilateral 
negotiations, led the EU to actively promote a multilateral rules-based approach in it’s trade 
policy and engage more actively in the ongoing negotiations at the WTO called the Uruguay 
Trade Round.  
Despite the EU’s engagement in multilateral trade liberalization, Member State governments 
continued to demand protection for vulnerable domestic sectors. This was reflected in EU 
common policies, most obviously in consistently high barriers on imports of agricultural and 
labour-intensive goods that could compete with European producers (Pilegaard, 2005: 106). 
The EU and Japan were among the only major agricultural producers to consistently maintain 
high levels of protection for their agricultural products with others like the US, Canada and 
Australia either having consistently low levels of protection or significantly reducing them 
after the mid 1980’s (Hoeller et.al., 1998: 22). 
Some say that the driving force behind the Uruguay Round was a fear that the increasing use 
of free trade agreements across the globle, which not only included the US and the EU but 
many developing countries as well, would fragment the global trading system and cause a 
further race for protectionism. Especially the EUs fear of the consequences of its exclusion 
from the US’ potential  free trade agreement with the Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC), drove the EU to push for more engagement in the WTO as an APEC regional 
agreement that left out the EU would have been extremely detrimental to its export interests 
(WTO, 1995; Winters, 1996; Panagariya, 1998:).  
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The WTO experienced a continued membership expansion in these years and the Uruguay 
Round was the first time the negotiations were conducted by, and applied to, over 100 
members. The scope of the negotiations also increased substantially. While previous 
negotiation rounds had mainly concerned themselves with tariffs, regulatory issues now 
became more important. The inclusion of rules on investment, intellectual property rights, 
trade in services, government procurement and competition policy signaled the continuation 
of a process of expanding the GATT trade regime to include a wide range of behind-the-border 
issues, and to include an increasing number of countries (Pilegaard, 2005: 109; Hoeller et al, 
1998). The expanded scope was promoted by the US, which perceived its comparative 
advantages to lie in intellectual property and services, and therefore worked for a stronger 
protection of these areas and the opening of foreign markets for services and products with a 
high intensity of intellectual property (Mattoo & Subramanian, 2012: 1374). 
The Uruguay Round saw the EU again come under pressure to liberalize its agricultural policy. 
Besides the US, a group of countries with significant interests in liberalizing agricultural trade 
were pressuring the EU to loosen its protective policies. The Uruguay Round was negotiated 
as a single undertaking, meaning that nothing was agreed until everything was agreed, and 
therefore the EU would have to give some concessions on agriculture if it wanted to achieve 
its own goals in liberalizing other areas of international trade (Pilegaard, 2005: 112). This was 
also one of the reasons behind the EU wanting to expand trade negotiations to include more 
regulatory issues in the first place. It expanded the scope of negotiations to areas were the EU 
would be able to trade liberalization and access for the decreased protectionism in its 
agricultural policy, which was increasingly becoming unavoidable. A fact that increased the 
EUs dissatisfaction with the WTO as the main forum for trade negotiations (Young, 2000: 5). 
The Uruguay Round also created deep changes in the judicial weight of the multilateral 
trading system, as a stronger dispute settlement system was introduced. This had very 
concrete consequences for the EU, as the legal grey area within which the Lomé Convention 
existed, was threatened by countries dissatisfied with the preferences given to the ACP 
(Pilegaard, 2005: 114). This was one of several developments that lead to the demise of Lomé 
non-reciprocal trade preferences between the EU and the ACP. Politically, the EU experienced 
a lot of pressure to bring its trade relationship with the ACP into line with WTO rules. A 
fundamental pillar of EU trade policy since its inception had been the support of multilateral 
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trade rules and it could therefore not pursue international cooperation agreements like Lomé 
that demanded exception from these very same rules.  
Furthermore, it has been proposed that the EU was not willing to spend the political capital 
necessary to get emerging economies among the G20 to support a waiver necessary to 
continue the non-reciprocal trade preferences it was offering the ACP.  The emerging 
economies that dominated the G20, such as India and China,  were growing in influence in the 
international arena and as the EU was trying to get access to their markets it was hesitant to 
ask them for support, fearing what they would ask for liberalization of European agriculture 
and fisheries in return (Faber & Orbie 2009a: 54).  
In the late 1990s the EU played a more active and leading role in international trade, 
providing its own proposal for multilateral trade agendas, and pressing the US to agree to a 
new round of trade negotiations. To underline its dedication to multilateralism the EU 
implemented a moratorium on itself concerning the commencement of new preferential trade 
agreement negotiations (Woolcock, 2012: 74), meaning this tool would not play a central role 
in its trade policy. This was supposed to signal to the rest of the world that multilateralism 
was the top EU trade priority. The EU was simultaneously facing a number of challenges that 
had not been solved by the Uruguay Round that ended in 1994. Firstly, the deepening of the 
trade agenda to include a number of regulatory issues needed to be prioritized more. This 
pleased many European business interests that felt that national regulatory differences would 
become an increasing problem given, among other things, the growing proportion of trade 
being conducted intra-firm and an increase in outsourcing, both of which see national 
differences in regulatory rules on especially services, investment and intellectual property 
protection as a significant obstacle (Siles Brugge, 2012).  Secondly, the US and many 
developing countries were still dissatisfied with the lack of liberalization of EUs agricultural 
policy. Developing countries felt that despite having agreed to a number of liberalization 
issues, they were not getting the market access they were entitled to as they labored under 
new legislation they did not have the capacity to implement properly (Pilegaard, 2005: 115).  
Lomé Failings lead to Change 
The European Commission, when preparing the Cotonou agreement between the EU and the 
ACP that replaced Lomé IV in 2000, realized that the previous practices of providing non-
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reciprocal trade preferences to the ACP had not had the desired effect.  While some countries 
had been able to use the preferential arrangements to achieve commercial success, many ACP 
countries “lacked the economic policies and domestic conditions needed for developing trade” 
(European Commission, 1996:iv).  This was exemplified by the fact that though the EU market 
accounted for  an average of 40% of ACP country sales, ACP exports constituted a declining 
share of the EU market, dropping from 6,7% in 1976 to  2,8% in 1994 (European Commission, 
1996: xiii). Furthermore, Sub-Saharan Africa went from conducting 2/3 of its trade with the 
EU in 1960, to only ¼ in 2011, with China increasingly taking larger shares of sub-Saharan 
African exports (Financial Times, 2012). Additionally, the ACP countries only accounted for 3 
% of EU exports, leading the European Commission to conclude that EU-ACP trade was 
“important for the ACP, but marginal for the EU “(Ravenhill, 2002: 9).  
ACP exports to the EU fell in absolute terms during Lomé, despite receiving the most generous 
preferences of any country grouping (Makhan, 2009:40). ACP exports were outperformed on 
the EU import market by other developing countries, especially newly industrialized 
countries (NICs) such as South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan. Though this can be 
ascribed to many factors the development did pose questions about the previous paths 
followed for ACP development. The NICs economic success, achieved without preferential 
access to the EU, was seen by some as a direct ideological challenge to the “development via 
preferences” view that defined relations with the ACP under Lomé’s non-reciprocity 
(Pilegaard, 2005: 151).   
The need for a change in trade policy towards the ACP was precipitated by other external 
factors as well. Among the most important was the WTOs findings that the preferential 
treatment given by the EU to bananas exported from ACP countries, did not live up to WTO 
rules of non-discrimination (WTO, 2009). The dispute’s relevance for the Lomé Conventions 
reached beyond just bananas as the GATT Banana Panel declared in 1994 that Lomé itself 
went against GATT rules and so had to be reformed (Stevens, et.al, 1998: 18).  
As mentioned in the previous section, the importance of maintaining the legitimacy of the 
WTO was especially important for the EU at this point. The EU was strategically prioritizing a 
leadership role for itself within the WTO, and this meant that it could no longer proceed with 
an agreement that ignored or required waivers from fundamental principles of the WTO. 
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Additionally, developing countries were becoming increasingly vocal in their opposition to EU 
agricultural protectionism and together with the US and other larger agricultural exporters, 
were creating a front that challenged the EUs ability to lead multilateral trade negotiations. 
The banana dispute therefore “ had a disproportionate impact by shattering the shell of a 
relationship that had been weakened already by underlying change” (Stevens et.al., 1998: v). 
Launch of Doha Round: Cracks in WTO deepen 
The EU succeeded in gaining latent support for the launch of a new multilateral trade 
negotiations at the WTO and so the Doha Development Round launched in 2001, but with no 
agreement on objectives or ways to achieve them (Schwab, 2011: 106). During this period of 
negotiations the US, Japan and to some degree China, were engaging aggressively in 
concluding bilateral and regional trade agreements, mainly with other countries in Asia and 
the Americas (Makhan, 2009:30). As the EU had a self implemented moratorium on doing the 
same, not only was its leadership position at the WTO being undermined, buts its competitive 
position in the global economy was being undermined as well. While other economies were 
pursuing access to new markets, the EU was ineffectually trying to keep multilateral 
negotiations going.  
Like previous trade rounds, the Doha Round saw the EU experience a lot of pressure from 
other agricultural exporting nations, like the US and Brazil, to liberalize its agricultural 
support.  Despite this, the EUs long running trade dispute with the US over European 
agricultural subsidies diminished in importance, as the EU implemented changes to the 
subsidy structure, and this allowed the EU and US to find a common position on agriculture 
going into 2003 (Woolcock, 2012:76).  
Unfortunately for them, the time when EU and the US could secure progress at the WTO by 
agreeing amongst themselves had passed, and the further negotiations were blocked by a 
group of developing and emerging countries that saw the US and EU as seeking to impose 
excessive burdens and obligations on them (Schwab, 2011: 106). The WTO was seeing a shift 
of power that made it increasingly difficult for the EU and the US to get what they wanted 
without giving concessions on sensitive areas. If they wanted increased access in dynamic 
emerging markets, they would have to give more concessions than they had previously been 
willing to give. The US saw the writing on the wall first and refocused on bilateral trade 
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negotiations, where it could more effectively leverage its markets size and take advantage of 
power asymmetries. For the EU, this realization took a few more years.   
WTO negotiations partially broke down after 2003 but continued to work on a more reduced 
agenda with focus on the reciprocal market access. In 2004 an agreement on negotiating 
parameters was made, but further break downs were experienced in 2006, 2007 and 2008 
(Schwab, 2011: 106). The EU and US wanted market access for goods and services in 
emerging markets while India and Brazil demanded reduced agricultural support in return 
(Woolcock, 2012: 77).  A final impasse was reached in 2008 resulting from disagreements 
essentially between India and the United States concerning safeguard measures for 
agriculture (Scott & Wilkinson, 2011: 16). 
The EU tried, but failed, to include regulatory issues on services, investment and intellectual 
property in the Doha agenda. Along with competition policy and public procurement, the 
negotiation of these issues was seen by the EU as central to establishing its competitiveness in 
emerging markets. But their inclusion was met by a lot of resistance from developing 
countries and the issues were not included in the agenda (Alavi et al, 2007: 60; Woolcock, 
2012: 79). Areas the EU deemed as central to maintaining a dominant position in the global 
economy were therefore not negotiated at Doha, and so the relevance of the round for the EU 
diminished.   
The EUs growing dissatisfaction with the WTO as an effective forum to regulate global trade 
according to their interests is an important driver of the EUs trade policy, but is itself based  
on other fundamental changes in the international system. The growing importance of 
emerging economies in the global economy is a result of their prominent role in the way 
modern trade is organized. This organization has seen growth, jobs and investment move to 
East Asia and therefore also increased the importance of this area for global trade. The role of 
East Asia in global production networks in which the EU and the US have large and competing 
interests, means the rules governing trade in this region becomes of paramount importance to 
both of them, especially the rules regarding areas which are central to the competitiveness of 
the western economies, like those for services and intellectual property. These elements will 
therefore be explored further in the following chapter.   
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4. Systemic Drivers: Global Trade Shifts 
and US Trade Policy  
Introduction 
There are two main sets of drivers behind the EUs shift in trade policy in recent years. The 
first set relates to the changing composition of global production networks and the role of 
East Asia in these networks. One of the most significant drivers of the changes seen in global 
power, and thereby also EU trade policy, since the late 1990s is this change in the composition 
of global production. Economic growth, international investment and jobs in especially 
manufacturing have moved to East Asia and if the EU is to maintain a dominant position in the 
global economy, it is necessary to respond to these changes in a way which helps it protect 
and promote those sectors on which it relies the most, namely services and intellectual 
property.  
The second set of drivers is the US’ decision to engage in bilateral trade negotiations outside 
the WTO so as to gain a foothold in new dynamic markets. These changes have caused the EU 
to increase its geographic focus in Asia while also increasingly pursuing regulatory reform in 
partner countries through its trade agreements. Getting foreign partner countries to 
implement rules and regulations that are friendly to EU businesses has become much more 
important for the EU than simply reducing tariffs, especially after the US has engaged in a 
similar trade strategy aimed at being the first to impose its regulatory frameworks on these 
markets.   
The following chapter will therefore elaborate a number of issues. First, it will explain how 
the countries of East Asia, especially India and China, have been able to experience such 
extensive economic growth in the last 20 years, and how this has placed them at the centre of 
global production networks. Secondly, it will be elaborated how this increased economic 
power has translated into increased political power at the global stage and how this has 
affected the ability of the EU and the US to pursue their goals. And finally, it will clarify how 
the US has reacted to these changes and therefore poses a challenge to the EUs ability to 
protect its interests and advantages in the global economy.  
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The First Set of Systemic Drivers: Global Production Shifts to Asia 
Unbundling Trade 
According to Baldwin (2011), globalization has seen two periods of unbundling. The first 
period consisted of the introduction of steam engines and railroads and allowed for the 
geographical unbundling of production and consumption. It became possible to transport 
goods cheaply across larger distances while logics of economies of scale and comparative 
advantage ensured this process was driven forward. This unbundling also created clustering. 
It became necessary for certain parts of production chains to stay close to each other as the 
constant flow of parts, ideas, investment and people was necessary for a continuous increase 
of productivity. “As production dispersed internationally, it clustered locally” (Baldwin, 2011:4). 
The second period of unbundling started between 1985 and 1995 and was precipitated by a 
revolution in information and communication technology. This fueled a spatial unbundling of 
production stages where proximity was no longer a necessity for the coordination between 
different stages of production. These stages could now be dispersed in a process called 
vertical specialization, where various production activities are carried out in different 
countries (Li & Zhang, 2008: 1278). This gave rise to the trade-investment-services nexus 
which consists of the intertwining of three elements 
1) Trade in goods 
2) International investment in production facilities, training, technology and long-
term business relationships  
3) The use of infrastructure services to coordinate the dispersed production, 
especially services such as telecoms, internet, express parcel delivery, air cargo, 
trade-related finance, customs clearance services, etc.  
(Baldwin, 2011:5).  
In this new kind of trade, the main obstacles for those wishing to extract value from global 
value chains, such as companies in the EU and US, are no longer tariffs, but the different rules 
across national jurisdictions which make value chains inefficient and difficult to coordinate 
(Shahid, 2012: 2). This becomes especially important in markets that are increasingly central 
to global production networks, but do not have regulatory frameworks which are coordinated 
with other parts of the value chains, especially those in industrialized western countries. To 
understand the rising importance of reforming domestic regulations, and especially the 
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importance of Asian markets, it is necessary to look closer at the second unbundling and how 
it formed the basis for the rise of the Asian Drivers.  
Production and Investment Flows to East Asia 
The most obvious consequence of the second period of unbundling is the rise of Asian Drivers, 
mainly  China and India (Kaplinsky & Messner, 2008).  The expansion of the Asian Driver 
economies can to some degree be seen as a result of the fragmentation of production 
processes which let them benefit from the large global wage discrepancies that were 
fundamental to the second unbundling (Baldwin, 2011; Ando & Kimura: 178). In this period 
East Asian countries pursued development strategies that actively engaged the state in 
attracting foreign direct investment and utilizing it strategically for development purposes 
(Ando & Kimura, 2005:178). The process was accompanied by liberalization strategies 
consisting of price deregulation, ownership reform of state-owned enterprises and unilateral 
lowering of MFN-tariffs with very little formal cooperation in the way of regional trade 
agreements (McDonald et.al, 2008: 211; Li & Zhang, 2008: 1278).  
The way China has been able to benefit from these changes and construct a dominant position 
for itself in the global economy is especially worth noting. FDI to China in 2004 was $56 
billion and represented  34 % of FDI to all developing countries, with most of this going to 
manufacturing, and “contributing to China becoming a centre for regional and global 
production networks” (Gottschalk, 2006: 102). Foreign direct investment reached a higher 
FDI/GDP ratio in South and South East Asia than in any other comparable regions from the 
mid 1980s to the late 1990s (Mcdonald, 2008: 211).  
In 2010 China became the world’s largest commodity exporter and the second largest 
importer with a six fold increase in total exports compared to 2001 when China became a 
WTO member. During the same period China’s share of global trade rose from 4,3% to 12 % 
and b it ecame the world’s largest trading nation measured by exports and imports of goods in 
2012 (Bloomberg, 2013; Gu et.al, 2008:275) . Besides being a leader in the export of a wide 
range of goods, China is also exporting higher value added and capital intensive products, 
showing that it is quickly moving up the value chain (Li & Zhang, 2008: 1278; Qureshi & Wan, 
2008: 1333) 
 
37 
 
Proof of Chinas increasing development is the fact that it has also increased its outward FDI to 
other developing countries, motivated by a wish to acquire foreign technology, establish 
distribution networks, relocate some industries to countries that have lower wages and gain 
access to natural resources. Especially Latin America, which has seen a large growth in 
exports of mineral and agricultural commodities to China, is a large receiver of Chinese FDI 
(Gottschalk, 2006: 104) with Sub-Saharan Africa has also experiencing a large influx of 
Chinese capital(Kaplinsky & Messner, 2008: 203).   
India has also seen significant economic growth in recent years coupled with an increased 
role for trade in its economy. From 1985-2006 the ratio of exports and imports to GDP 
increased from 6% to 24% while FDI inflows increased from 0,1% of GDP to 2% and exports 
increased by 11% a year (Ecorys et.al, 2009a: 34). Though lower labor costs are one of the 
main factors behind the growth of the Asian Drivers, China’s economic expansion eclipses 
India’s despite higher labor costs, while it has also become more integrated in global markets 
than India, as Chinas share of global exports is nearly six times larger. Nevertheless the 
contribution of low production costs and large labour forces could lead to both countries 
becoming the  driving forces of global trade for the next few decades (Qureshi & Wan, 2008: 
1329f). India’s economic growth is furthermore unique among developing countries in that 
the services sector has played a central role. Services contributed 55.5% of India’s GDP 
growth between 1981-2006 owing to the globalization of tradable services and advances in 
information and communication technology, while India’s pool of low-cost, educated, English 
speaking labor allowed it to insert itself in the global services supply chain (Li, 2008: 1280)   
Another indicator of the economic development of East Asia is the rapid development of 
intraregional trade, increasing from $104 billion in 1981 to $702 billion in 2001, followed by 
an increasing vertical specialization, where intermediates are imported and used in goods 
that are exported, especially in  machinery and components (Ando & Kimura, 2005: 183).  
This kind of trade was until the mid-1980s focused around Europe and North America, but 
today supply chains have internationalized and vertical specialization trade has moved to Asia 
(Baldwin, 2011: 7).  
 When seen together with the decline in one-way trade, understood as trade  from one 
country to another, this change emphasizes a shift away from a model of one country selling 
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to another, towards a model where parts are imported, processed, and then exported on.  This 
can especially be seen in the way Chinas exports to industrialized countries increased from 
1990-2005 and comparatively decreased to the developing world. In the same period imports 
from developing countries increased suggesting that China “is becoming a world factory for re-
exports” (Qureshi & Wan, 2008: 1329).  
Though global manufacturing capabilities have moved to East Asia, there has, until recently, 
been less movement concerning innovation capabilities. These were, and are, still firmly 
concentrated in the EU, the US and Japan, but the gap between them and China may be 
shrinking (Altenburg et.al, 2008:330). This underlines the importance that the EU and US 
allocate to the protection of these capabilities, which explains their focus on protecting 
elements central to extracting value from innovation, like intellectual property rights.  
Asian Drivers in the Multilateral System 
Politically, the last decade has seen a significant increase in the influence of especially India 
and China in global governance as result of their growing importance in the global economy. 
Though China’s engagement in global organizations is more recent than India’s, they both 
represent a shift in global power, asserting themselves as leaders of developing and emerging 
country groupings in the UN and the WTO (Kaplinsky, 2008: 201).  The shift in power in the 
multilateral arenas reflects how emerging economies have increased their market size, trade 
volume and engagement in global governance and are becoming increasingly able convert 
these resources in to power and influence (Xiaodong, 2012: 36). An example of this was seen 
at the Doha Round where the central negotiating grouping consisted of the EU, US, Brazil and 
India and during the significant mini-ministerial in Geneva that should have closed Doha, the 
group was joined by China and Japan (Xiaodong, 2012: 36).   
The Asian drivers growing role could transform the current” quasi unilateral world order into 
a de facto multipolar power constellation” (Humphrey & Messner, 2006: 108) within the next 
15 years, posing a series of questions about how this new order will arrange and govern itself.  
Chief among these questions is how the industrialized nations will handle the rise of countries 
that are increasingly threatening their dominant positions in the global economy (Gu et.al, 
2008: 274). The power asymmetries on which the EU and the US base much of their trade 
policy, are less obvious in relations with China and India than with smaller developing 
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economies, and therefore presents challenges concerning how, and if, the West will achieve its 
goals. China especially, has already shown that it is willing to leverage its market size, trading 
market access for technologies, saying that investors must share some of their knowledge if 
they want access to the Chinese market (Altenburg et.al, 2008: 338). Chinas increasing market 
size, capital accumulation, position in global production networks and outward FDI means 
there are several factors that are increasing its power resources, which it could leverage for 
influence in many other areas. International rules for trade, property rights and investment 
being an obvious example, given the framework of this thesis.  
The rise of the Asian Drivers is one of the most important sets of systemic drivers that affect 
the EU, and the way it reacts to them will determine its place in the future global economy. 
But there are others that it must focus on as well.  The EU’s competitors are also acting on the 
changes that are happening in East Asia and trying to use it to their advantage. It is this 
second set of drivers that will be covered in the next section where the actions of the US will 
be analyzed to show how they also constitute systemic drivers of EU trade policy.  
The Second Set of Systemic Drivers: US Trade Policy  
US Trade Strategy: Competitive Liberalization 
From the beginning of the post war period until the early 80’s the US had been a staunch 
supporter of multilateralism (Panagariya, 1998: 7). This can to some degree be explained by 
the fact that multilateralism, and specifically the creation and expansion of the GATT, was not 
designed to liberalize areas in which the West did not have an advantage, such as agriculture, 
nor promote trade-led growth in states outside the West (Scott & Wilkinsom, 2011: 5). The 
larger trading powers have historically dominated negotiations securing specific advantages 
for themselves, while disregarding the needs of less developed countries. The way global 
power was mirrored in the GATT “ensured that consecutive trade rounds produced ever greater 
asymmetries of economic opportunity […] from the outset the GATT comprised rules and 
procedures designed to preserve the institutional advantages of its creator states” (Scott & 
Wilkinson, 2011: 6). 
The US tried to start an eighth multilateral trade round in 1982, but got no support from the 
EU, that refused to give the US concessions on EU agricultural subsidies. A concession that 
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would not only have benefitted the US directly, but the promise of which could have been 
used to get developing countries to liberalize on issues such as protection of investment, 
intellectual property rights, services and government procurement (Baghwati, 1994:6; 
Baghwati, 1991: 1). Because of this standstill, bilateral trade agreements were seen by the US 
as the only option to maintain a process of continuing trade liberalization, and the US 
consequently entered into trade agreements with Israel in 1985 and Canada in 1989. Though 
the Uruguay round started up in the meantime, the US’ dissatisfaction with the EU’s ambition 
was one of the drivers behind its signing a comprehensive trade agreement with Mexico and 
Canada, named the North American Free Trade agreement (NAFTA) in 1992 (Panagariya, 
1998: 7).   
The US therefore became the first large trading power to concretely opt out of the multilateral 
trading system because of dissatisfaction with progress. By showing that bilateral options 
were a viable alternative to the WTO, it showed the cracks in the WTO system. Cracks which 
other countries later expanded and which created a rapid increase in  bilateral trade 
agreements as a growing number of countries lost faith in the ability of the WTO to regulate 
international trade and feared being left behind by competitors which moved first into the 
bilateral arena.  
In 2002 the US formulated a new trade strategy called Competitive Liberalization. The US 
perceived itself as losing a global race for access to the most important markets, and the new 
strategy was meant to correct this situation (Quiliconi & Wise, 2009: 98). Since the year 2000 
the US has concluded free trade agreements with Australia, Bahrain, Colombia, Chile,  Jordan, 
Oman, Morocco, Singapore, Peru, 6 countries in central America, Korea and Panama. It is 
furthermore negotiating trade agreements with Thailand, UAE, the Andean Community7 and 
the South African Customs Union as well as a regional trade agreement called the Trans-
Pacific Partnership8 and has started trade negotiations with the EU (Whalley, 2008: 519; 
Export.gov, 2013).  
                                                        
7 Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, Colombia 
8 The parties to this agreement besides the US are:  Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Malaysia, Mexico, New 
Zealand, Peru, Singapore, Vietnam. On March 15, 2013 Japan announced that it wanted to join as well (Ferguson 
et al 2013: Summary) 
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US free trade agreements under the Competitive Liberalization framework are based on the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which means they are usually symmetrical 
and reciprocal, their main objective is access and they seek ambitious reforms on both 
services and intellectual property that do not allow for wide degrees of flexibility (Ahearn, 
2011). NAFTA signaled the arrival of a deeper form of regionalism that had not previously 
been seen, and the agreement serves as a gold standard for US free trade agreements. It 
includes a wide variety of regulatory provisions and is unusual in that there are no provisions 
in it that accord special treatment to Mexico because of its level of economic development 
(Irish, 2008: 103). The inclusion of intellectual property rights and rules on investment in a 
free trade agreement was an innovation in the international trading system at the time and 
was a development that made all trading states, including the EU, re-evaluate their trade 
policies (Sbragia, 2010: 376). 
Competitive Liberalization has three main goals. Firstly, to offer access to the US market to 
countries willing to open their markets to US companies and farmers. This is intended to 
create an environment where other countries compete against each other for preferential 
access to the US, which the US can use to obtain concessions in trade negotiations.  The US 
wants to “exert maximum leverage for openness” (Evenett & Meier, 2008: 36). Secondly, the US 
wants other countries to implement US-style business friendly reforms and regulations. These 
two goals are to be accomplished both through multilateral negotiations at the WTO, and via 
bilateral and regional free trade agreements. Finally, the US wants to use its trade policy to 
gain support for US foreign policy objectives (Evenett & Meier, 2008: 31).  
Though this type of strategy had been attempted by previous US administrations, the manner 
with which it was implemented by the Bush administration lead to a sharp increase in 
bilateral agreements (Sbragia, 2010: 377). The focus on bilateralism, and increasing leverage 
by negotiating on several levels and with several partners simultaneously, caused others to 
pursue the same course. Mexico and Chile increased their trade agreement activity, which 
firstly created an increase in trade agreements in the Americas and later spread to East Asia 
(Solis & Katada; 2009: 7). The EU also belatedly reacted by formulating and pursuing Global 
Europe which mirrored Competitive Liberalization in many aspects, especially its pursuit of 
deeper agreements and its renewed focus on bilateralism (Henon, Siles-Brugge, 2012: 250). 
These issues will be elaborated further in the two next chapters  
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The First Agreements  
In 2003 US merchandise trade and investment with the ASEAN9 region was $120 billion, with 
the East Asian countries showing further progress in regional integration and intra-region 
trade than either Africa or the Middle-East. Ensuring a presence in the region for the US was 
therefore seen as a priority. The US therefore decided to either negotiate with countries 
individually, as the case was with Singapore, or as part of the larger regional Transpacific 
Partnership (Schott, 2006: 123).  Singapore was the first country in the region to negotiate 
with the US and was chosen as it fulfilled the US objectives of being a supporter of US foreign 
policy, and allowed the US to secure trade rules in a country that was negotiating similar 
agreements with China. Singapore was already a highly developed economy with a large 
services sector meaning that sensitive issues such as agriculture were left out of negotiations. 
The final result therefore ”reflected a trade relationship between two high-technology partners” 
(Quiliconi & Wise, 2009: 113). Singapore also had almost no tariff barriers to trade to begin 
with, so the focus of negotiations could be exclusively on regulatory issues (Whalley, 2008: 
520).  
In 2004 the US attempted to negotiate a regional agreement with the Andean countries10, but 
these negotiations failed and the U.S. therefore continued bilateral negotiations with Peru and 
Colombia. Colombia constituted a small share of U.S. trade (0.9%), but is a key ally of the U.S. 
and therefore fulfills one of the main criteria of Competitive Liberalization. The agreement 
contains obligations on a wide range of issues including market access for goods, services, 
investment, IPR and government procurement. U.S. exports to Colombia face tariffs of 20% or 
more and so an agreement is predicted to increase trade to the (small) benefit of the U.S. with 
especially agricultural producers seeing potential benefits. American goods and services 
business have also noted that an agreement will provide them with a competitive advantage 
over foreign-owned businesses. Though the agreement has been negotiated and the 
Colombian parliament has signed it, it has not been implemented because of worries in the 
U.S. about crime and violation of labor rights (Villareal, 2011:1). 
In 2006 the U.S. and Peru signed a trade agreement that eliminated tariffs and a wide range of 
barriers to trade in goods and services. Though small in economic size compared to the U.S., 
                                                        
9 Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Burma, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam 
10 Colombia, Peru and Ecuador. Usually Bolivia is also in this group but they did not participate in these 
negotiations.  
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Peru saw strong growth between 5% and 8% a year for the four years preceding the 
agreements conclusion. The agreement requires Peru to go beyond its commitments at the 
WTO for services liberalization and removes a wide range of national requirements on foreign 
businesses (Villareal, 2008: 2-8). U.S investors are also guaranteed rights to establish, acquire 
and operate investments in Peru on equal footing with local investors, while the agreement 
also ensures protection for intellectual property which is consistant with U.S. standards and 
frameworks (USTR, 2007)   
In 2007 the US concluded a trade agreement with South Korea. The trade agreement not only 
covers traditional areas like manufacturing, but regulatory areas like foreign investment, 
services, government procurement and services, as had become the norm for the U.S’ at this 
point. The US prioritized obtaining access and conducive conditions for services, investment 
and agriculture, as these were the areas where the US was internationally competitive, but 
where barriers in South Korea were still high. Though the overall contribution to the US 
economy will be negligible at 0,1% of GDP, the services industry in the US will get a large 
boost from the agreement (Cooper et.al, 2013: 6).  
The agreement itself includes a number of liberalizations on the services front. It provides for 
national11 and Most Favoured Nation treatment12 of each countries services imports, 
prohibits limits on market access, prohibits FDI requirement on issues such as local content 
while also removing a number of other restrictions on service provision. It also provides a 
wide range of protections for intellectual property which goes beyond the obligations given 
under the WTO Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) (Cooper, et.al, 
2013:29-38).  
Though the US tried to negotiate bilaterally with other countries in East Asia, these talks were 
often bogged down by disagreements on sensitive issues such as public procurement rules 
(for Malaysia) or patent protection (Vietnam)(Prapasri, 2010; Channel News Asia, 2010; 
Martin, 2011).  In most cases the US therefore opted to negotiate free trade rules with these 
countries via a regional free trade agreement called the TransPacific Partnership (TPP), as the 
                                                        
11 Meaning that a country must not discriminate against firms from the other negotiating party for the benefit of 
its own national firms.  
12 Most Favoured Nation treatment means that any preferences that a party to an agreement provides to a third 
country, must then also be provided to the other party of the original agreement.  
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group included important trading partners for the U.S. For example, trade with Vietnam had 
increased from $220 million in 1994 to $18.6 billion in 2010, while Vietnam is a major source 
for clothing, footwear, furniture and electrical machinery into the U.S. Strategic considerations 
were also involved, as the U.S. worried about the consequences of being excluded from the 
increased integration of the ASEAN region which included many of the countries also included 
in the TPP, but which excluded the U.S. (Martin, 2011: 4).  
The U.S also started negotiations with Vietnam on a Bilateral Investment Treaty in 2008 that 
would establish better access and protection for U.S. investors, but since the initiation of 
negotiations on the TPP, these talks have stopped. The U.S. has previously had a trade 
agreement in place with Vietnam which liberalized the Vietnam services market in a number 
of areas as well as providing for increased protection of investment and intellectual property 
which in some areas go beyond obligations that Vietnam would otherwise have had at the 
WTO (Mai, 2001). The U.S. also has a number unbinding strategic framework agreements with 
East Asian countries that include political obligations to liberalize trade and provide 
protection for investment and intellectual property (USTR, 2013b)   
 The Transpacific Partnership is today one of the U.S’ highest trade priorities but was 
originally an agreement between Singapore, New Zealand and Chile. It has since expanded to 
now include 12 countries from North and Central America, East Asia and the South Pacific. 
The agreement is intended to cover a wide range of issues including intellectual property 
rights, services, government procurement, investment, competition and more. The degree of 
commitment is expected to go beyond the comparable rules found at the WTO and require 
“substantial restructuring of the economies of some participants”, most likely the least 
developed and most protected of the participating countries (Ferguson et.al., 2013: i-1). 
U.S trade with the TPP countries amounted to more than $1.3 billion in goods and $172 billion 
in services in 2012, and especially Malaysia and Vietnam are singled out as the most 
important countries to achieve agreements with, as they have large markets, have seen larger 
growth rates and also have significant levels of protection. The U.S. has prioritized market 
access for service providers, and especially seeks to expand on what it sees as the limited 
obligations given at the WTO. The limited progress of regulatory reform at the Doha Round 
also provides motivation for the US to engage more actively in achieving these objectives 
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regionally, then wait for negotiations at the multilateral level to thaw (Ferguson et.al, 2013: 
19) . 
The U.S has also tried to negotiate free trade agreements with some African countries and 
regions. In late 2002, the year that Competitive Liberalization was formulated, the U.S. started 
free trade negotiations with the South African Customs Unions13, but negotiations broke down 
in 2006 due to disagreements on the scope of the negotiations. Nevertheless a political 
cooperation agreement called the Trade, investment and Development Cooperation 
Agreement was signed in 2008, which intended to create a forum for discussion on the issues 
that could be covered by a free trade agreement, such as investment, standards and technical 
barriers to trade (Jones & Williams, 2012: 32).  The U.S. has furthermore signed Trade and 
Investment Framework agreements with a wide range of African countries and regions14, 
which are precursors to free trade agreements and commit signatories to expand trade in 
goods and services and encourage investment.  The U.S. also has a wide range of Bilateral 
Investment Treaties in Africa15 designed to protect U.S. investment and encourage policy 
changes in the partner countries (Jones & Williams, 2012: 33 
The increased importance of services and investment in global trade as well as the actions of 
major players like the US and China are issues that the EU cannot ignore if it is to maintain its 
position in the global economy and ensure continued preferential conditions for European 
businesses. The following will therefore elaborate how the EU has reacted to the drivers 
presented in this chapter to ensure a beneficial position for its most important sector, the 
services industry, in its expanding network of trade agreements in both developing and 
developed countries.  
  
                                                        
13 Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland 
14 Angola, Ghana, Liberaia, Mauritius, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, South Africa, COMESA, East African 
Community and WAEMU 
15 The U.S. has BITs with Cameroon, Republic of Congo, Democratic Republic of Congo, Mozambique, Rwanda and 
Senegal and is negotiating one with the East African Community.  
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5. The EU Reacts to Systemic Drivers I: 
EPAs  
Introduction 
The changes in the global political economy described in the previous chapter required a 
reaction from the EU if it was to maintain its comparative advantages in the global economy 
and ensure access for its companies to new dynamic markets that was comparative to the that 
obtained by the US.  With the growth and increasing power of the Asian drivers, along with 
the increased aggressiveness of the US in its trade policy, the EU risked getting left behind. It 
therefore decided to make an overhaul of all its trading relationships.  
The first step was that it would no longer provide non-reciprocal preferences to the ACP in 
goods-only trading arrangements. The increased role of emerging economies at the WTO and 
the effect it has had on negotiations, along with the perceived failure of Lomé to provide 
economic growth and diversification in the ACP, motivated the EU to engage in new trading 
negotiations with the ACP that would culminate in what is now known as Economic 
Partnership Agreements, or EPAs. The EU hoped to bring its trade relationship with the ACP 
under the umbrella of its overall trade policy and so in the areas of services and investment 
the EU used the same templates for the EPAs as it did with its other free trade agreements 
under Global Europe. The EU thereby hoped to use these negotiations to not only liberalize 
trade in goods, but also open services markets and provide protection for investment and 
intellectual property rights, thereby ensuring that European services and capital would 
benefit from the new trading arrangements.  
Justification for Agreements with the ACP 
Though the ACP economies are small, there were signs that engaging in closer reciprocal 
trade relations had benefits. In 2000 the value of trade between the EU and the ACP increased 
by 26%, and a further 9% the year after, while in the same years exports to the ACP increased 
21% and 4% respectively. This lead the Commission to suggest that the standstill that had 
characterized the trade relationship between the two regions in the 1990s might be changing 
(European Commission, 2002). In the period from 1999-2004 EU imports from the ACP 
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increased 27% and exports 20% (European Commission, 2005a), so even without any of the 
intended reforms, trade was increasing between the two regions, perhaps implying that the 
ACP countries were on their way up. Though global commodity prices had played a part in the 
growth of Africa in the period 2000-2008, natural resources accounted for only 24%. Retail, 
transport, telecommunications and manufacturing, along with other sectors had all played a 
significant role. Along with structural reforms and political stability they contributed to FDI in 
Africa increasing from $9 billion in 2000 to $62 billion in 2008. The same FDI-to-GDP ratio as 
China (Roxburgh et.al., 2010: 2).  
This provides a number of economic possibilities for the EU, chief among which is the fact that 
potential annual revenue in the African consumer sector, which includes services, is projected 
to reach $1.3 trillion in 2020. This offers increased incentive for the EU to obtain a strong 
position in these markets, an important step towards which is to gain the first-mover 
advantages that may be available in reforming the regulatory frameworks for these sectors 
(Roxburgh et.al, 2010:7). The fact that the US was also creating a presence for itself in Africa 
via its Trade and Investment Framework Agreements and a vast network of Bilateral 
Investment Treaties as mentioned in the previous chapter undoubtedly also provided 
motivation for the EU to secure that its business would not be excluded from the potential 
benefits provided by these markets.  
EPAs as Free Trade Agreements 
According to some accounts the EU negotiators treated the negotiations of EPAs not as 
development agreements, but as traditional free trade negotiations or commercial negotiations 
showing little interest in development aspects, reflecting the new focus of the EU in the face of 
recent changes in the global economy (Ravenhill, 2002, 14; Elgström, 2009: 25).  
This point was further supported when looking at the original Green Paper on the ACP-EU 
relationship (1996). Here the proposals for what would later become Cotonou and the EPAs, 
included little or no additional benefits for ACP countries, but instead increased demands for 
the ACP should they wish to maintain their current market access to the EU (Morrissey et.al, 
2007: 200). Many academics have pointed out that the revisions on trade, from Lomé to 
Cotonou, reflect a substantial change to the EU-ACP relationship. The introduction of 
reciprocity signaled the end of a relationship defined by preferences accorded because of 
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political history and the start of one based on purely economic considerations (Dickson, 
2004). This also provided the foundation for bringing the EU-ACP trade relationship under the 
umbrella of the EUs overall trade policy which was presented in 2006 as Global Europe which 
will be elaborated in the next chapter 
Many ACPs engaged hesitantly in the EPA process to begin with, doing so more out of a wish 
to preserve political ties and aid flows, than from a strategic choice to utilize trade policy in 
their development strategies (Makhan, 2009: 82). ACP dependence on the EU was the 
underlying factor that would shadow the negotiations from the very beginning, and which is 
underlined by the difference between the demands and wishes of the ACP, and the actual 
content of the agreements. The agreements take a striking similarity to the EUs other free 
trade agreements under Global Europe, where deep liberalization is prioritized and special 
treatment on the basis of development status is a secondary concern.  
Aspirations towards the EPAs as drivers of regional integration were hampered early on, as 
the African regional groupings were only based on existing groupings in one case, the East 
African Community. This created a situation where regions were not able to negotiate on 
issues of regional integration lest they end with a commitment that directly contradicted a 
country’s obligation to another regional cooperation (Stevens, 2008: 74). Attempts by the ACP 
to even out the power asymmetries of the negotiating relationships by acting collectively were 
therefore undermined from the start.   
The political will to complete the negotiations was often lacking on both sides and the 
negotiations stood still from 2002-2004.There was little interest from either ACP or EU 
Member States to conclude any agreements and the EU, showed no interest in promoting a 
more aggressive agenda (Siles-Brügge, 2012:14). It is possible that this was due to the fact 
that the Doha Round had not yet broken down, and contracting parties to the Cotonou 
Agreement saw this as a viable alternative, therefore not seeing any rush to conclude the EPAs 
(Hodu, 2009: 239). When the Doha Round effectively broke down in 2005 the EU therefore 
seized its chance to expand EPA negotiations to include issues that were mainly in the interest 
of the EU, such as wide ranging liberalization of services and protection for intellectual 
property and investment.  From this point the EPAs started to resemble the free trade 
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agreements that the EU would later negotiate under Global Europe with more developed 
countries such as South Korea and Singapore (Siles-Brügge, 2012). 
EPA negotiations were hurried to a disorderly conclusion near the end of 2007 as this was the 
deadline set by the WTO. Goods-only interim EPAs were signed with some countries while the 
only full EPA signed was with the CARIFORUM group from the Caribbean. The EU used the 
large asymmetries of its relationship with ACP countries, as well as their overwhelming 
dependence on the EU market, to force through agreements that had limited support on the 
ACP side at best. On the other hand some of the ACP countries used the presence of relevant 
alternatives, like the EUs unilateral preference schemes the General System of Preferences 
(GSP) and Everything but Arms (EBA), to resist the pressure to sign.  The fact that LDCs had 
access to the EU market via the EBA removed the EUs control over its market access as a 
power resource and therefore prevented it from converting it into power at the negotiation 
table.   
The EU clearly attempted to use its dominant position to control both the negotiating forum 
and the agenda. When regions became too obstructive, the EU negotiated with the individual 
countries instead, in the hope that the even larger power asymmetries would allow it to push 
through its agenda. This turned out to have limited success, with one of the explanations being 
availability of alternative, yet inferior, market access opportunities.   
Though most EPA negotiations were problematic and slow, a full EPA that included 
obligations on investment and services was achieved with the CARIFORUM region, and which 
therefore stands as a representative of what the EU is trying to achieve in the other EPA 
negotiations(Siles-Brugge 2012:163 ). The agreement also gives an understanding of the 
degree to which the EU is turning what was promised to the ACP as development oriented 
trade agreements, into competitive-driven free trade agreements with the main focus of 
providing opportunities and advantages to European businesses. When the new Global Europe 
trade agreements are analyzed in the next chapter it will become clear how the new EU trade 
regime does not differentiate significantly between trade agreements with developed and 
developing countries. An important indicator of the degree to which the EU feels increased 
pressure from the systemic changes elaborated in the previous chapter.   
50 
 
The CARIFORUM EPA 
The only full EPA that has been signed so far is between the EU and the CARIFORUM16 group 
of countries. Among the ACP countries the Caribbean countries are among the most developed 
and have the most diversified economies. They are either balanced between industry, 
agriculture and services, or dominated by services and do not rely upon one or two main 
exports as is the case for many other ACP countries and regions (PWC, 2004: xiii). Despite its 
advanced level of development and negotiating capacity compared to other ACP countries, the 
CARIFORUM region signed an EPA which disproportionately benefits EU interests to the 
detriment of the CARIFORUM.  
The obligations and commitments on services and investment in the CARIFORUM EPA are 
based on a template created for the Global Europe trade agreements (Kelsey, 2010:i), which 
places demands on the Caribbean countries that exceeds previous commitments given at the 
WTO (Sauvé & Ward, 2009: 137).  Developing countries have been successful in blocking 
increased commitments on these issues at the multilateral level, but have not had the same 
success bilaterally. Their inclusion in the CARIFORUM EPA reflects the interests of the EU and 
its dominance at the negotiating table, as they provide protection and opportunities for EU 
firms and investors which could not have been achieved multilaterally (Girvan, 2008: 4).  
For example, the MFN-clause of the agreement ensures that any benefits given to investors or 
businesses in developed or emerging economies like India or China is extended to the EU 
(CARIFORUM EPA, 2008: art 70).  This means that the EU will benefit from any agreement the 
CARIFORUM signs with other larger economies, but without having to offer the CARIFORUM 
anything in return (Kelsey, 2010: iii). This is a clear reaction to the increased economic threat 
the EU perceives as coming from large economies, and a way to ensure that its businesses 
always at least benefit from parity of conditions with its main competitors (Siles-Brügge, 
2012: 166).  
As the Caribbean countries have substantial services sectors the liberalization of services 
trade could benefit them if designed with that goal in mind. But the agreement has mostly 
provides benefits in areas important to the EU. The CARIFORUM had an interest in obtaining 
                                                        
16 This groups consists of the 16 Caribbean ACP countries: Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, 
Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Surinam, Saint Lucia, St. Christopher and 
Nevis, St. Vincent and Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago.   
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MFN treatment in the area of mode 4 services17, which allows Caribbean nationals to migrate 
temporarily to the EU for work. But this was limited by the EU which wanted to protect its 
markets from the import of cheap labor (Siles-Brügge, 2012:167; Hamdou, 2004:9: Girvan, 
2008: 12). The agreement also shows a strong asymmetry between obligations. In the areas of 
interest to the EU, like postal, financial and telecommunication services the agreement 
provides for a substantial degree of liberalization and strong regulatory discipline. But in 
areas that are prioritized by the CARIFORUM such as culture and tourism, the promises on 
cooperation are much softer. The agreement furthermore explicitly ignores flexibilities that 
are available at the WTO for developing countries when negotiating services, while the 
increase in commitments provided by the CARIFORUM states is “grossly disproportionate” to 
the new commitments made by the EU (Kelsey, 2010: ii) 
The agreement also includes a national treatment clause, meaning that the Caribbean 
countries are not allowed to discriminate against European services providers to their benefit 
of their own companies. If the two groups were competing on equal footing this might not 
have been a problem, but where the EU has tens of thousands of well established firms, the 
Caribbean has only a few. There is therefore a substantial risk that increased access for the EU 
will undermine this sector while the EPA removes the ability of the Caribbean government to 
provide infant industry protection (Girvan, 2008: 14) 
Though only some representative provision are mentioned here, it is clear that the EU has 
been able to convert its substantial economic resources into negotiating leverage that has 
resulted in an agreement that is distinctly asymmetric to the benefit of the EU. The EU has also 
successfully used its dominant position to decide the agenda and move the relevant 
negotiating forum from the obstructed WTO, to the bilateral level. The EU in this way 
succeeds in splintering the collective resistance to include further commitments on issues like 
services, investment, intellectual property that developing countries exhibited at the WTO.  
The more the EU template for the regulatory issues is accepted bilaterally or regionally, the 
less reason there will be for developing countries to continue the collective resistance at the 
WTO (Kelsey, 2010: 3) 
                                                        
17 Mode 4 refers to the last of 4 modes of trade in services as defined by the WTO General Agreement on Tariff in 
Services. These include 1)Cross Border Supply 2) Consumption Abroad 3) Commercial Presence 4) Presence of 
Natural Persons. (WTO, 1994: Art I:2) 
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A noticeable change in the EUs trade agreements today compared to before Cotonou, is that 
the EU pursues the same goals with its trade agreements regardless of the development status 
of its partners. This is exemplified by the chapter on services and investment in the 
CARIFORUM EPA which directly follows a template from Global Europe which is also used for 
the free trade negotiations with developed countries like Canada and South Korea (Kelsey, 
2010: i) The EPAs are therefore not development agreements, but commercial free trade 
agreements that can justifiably be seen as the first steps towards complying to the strategic 
imperatives outlined in EUs new trade strategy, Global Europe. This strategy is the EUs 
reaction to the systemic drivers mentioned in the previously and will therefore be elaborated 
in the following chapter.  
  
53 
 
6. The EU Reacts to Systemic Drivers II: 
Global Europe 
Introduction 
As the global geography of trade and production changed and the US adapted its trade policy 
to gain first mover advantages, it was necessary for the EU to change as well. It therefore 
formulated a new trade strategy called Global Europe. This strategy gave the EU a new 
geographical focus on emerging dynamic markets in East Asia and Latin America, while 
underlining the benefits of bilateralism as a way to pursue trade liberalization and regulatory 
reform. The strategy definitively carves out that the EU economy depends on trade in services 
and the protection of its intellectual property to achieve growth and job creation in Europe. 
The details of Global Europe as well as its implementation will be analyzed in the following to 
show how it is a reaction to the aforementioned systemic drivers, and how this can be 
interpreted as another attempt by the EU at competitive regionalism. The EUs use of 
asymmetrical power relationships to achieve its goals will also be underlined.  
The EUs New Strategic Framework 
Global Europe ushered in a new period of EU trade policy where it was accepted that the 
global economy that had been lead by the US, EU and Japan was changing. Global integration 
had increased, facilitated by falling transportation costs and a revolution in communication 
technology. The major trading powers had been joined by China, India, Brazil and Russia who 
were staking their claim on the global economic agenda (European Commission, 2006). Global 
Europe is in other words a direct strategic reaction, on the part of the EU, to the rise of 
emerging powers that resulted in part from the second unbundling mentioned in the Systemic 
Drivers chapter.  
Trade restricting measures and regulations are seen by the EU as the main obstacles to trade, 
and the EU specifically focuses on the need for stronger rules in intellectual property rights, 
services, investment, public procurement and competition, and the fact that trade agreements 
are an effective avenue to pursue these goals, given the lack of progress at the WTO. This is 
based on the importance of services to the economic position of the EU. About a third of the 3 
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million jobs created by exports  between 2000 and 2007 were in the services sector, while 
services also represent 60% of the value added  to products exported by the EU. Similarly, the 
EU sees the protection of intellectual property as central to ensuring the EUs added value in 
global value chains and to retaining a comparative advantage against competitors that have 
lower labor and material costs (European Commission, 2012e: 7). 
The main targets for the EUs new offensive trade strategy are identified on the basis of 
economic size, growth and level of domestic protection. This leads the EU to focus its new 
trade strategy on the Mercosur18 countries, the ASEAN region, South Korea, Russia and India. 
China is mentioned as also living up to many of the criteria to be a potential partner, but is 
deemed deserving of special treatment due to the “challenges it poses” (European 
Commission, 2006: 6-9). In an issue paper from 2005, the Commission presents an analysis of 
the main problems of the EU’s previous trade strategy,  underlining that EU trade was not 
strong enough in growing markets compared to its main competitors, the US and Japan. While 
less than half of EU trade between 1995-2002 was conducted with the ten markets which had 
provided 93% of the period’s growth, the US had conducted 79% of its trade with the same 
countries (European Commission, 2005: 26).  
The same study underlined that though both the EU, the U.S. and Japan were losing overall 
market share in the most dynamic regions, the EU was generally losing more than both the US 
and Japan From 2002 to 2005 Japans exports to China increased 75% further compounding 
the fact that the EU was being left behind. (European Commission, 2005: 27). Finally, the 
study presented the main sources of import increases during the preceding five years. The 
sources, as shown below in table 1,  provide the central inspiration for the EUs new 
geographical focus on ASEAN, Korea, India, and also on the EUs recent statements of initiating 
trade agreements with larger partners such as Japan and the US as wells as its cooperation 
agreement negotiations with China (European Commission, 2012c; European Commission 
2013). 
 
 
 
                                                        
18 Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, Venezuela 
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Table 1 Main Sources of World Imports Growth 
 Import Values 2003 in € Bn Share of Total World’s 
Imports Growth (1998-2003) 
USA 1124 27% 
China 321 18% 
ASEAN 327 8% 
Japan  326 7% 
Korea 152 6% 
Mexico 163 4% 
Hong Kong 191 3% 
Canada 230 3% 
India 61 2% 
Total  2947 77% 
Source: European Commission, 2005: 27 
In 2007 the Commission released an accompanying strategy document called The Partnership 
to Deliver Market Access which elaborated on the aspects of Global Europe that concerned 
opening foreign markets.  Here the previous focus on controlling tariff barriers is replaced by 
a new focus on behind-the-border issues “because of the growing importance and complexity of 
non-tariff barriers,” (European Commission, 2007: 3). In the EU’s view the WTO had not kept 
pace with the challenges of the new economy and so issues like customs procedures, technical 
regulations, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, restriction on raw material access, IPR 
problems, services liberalization, investment protection and  opening of government 
procurement markets must be solved in other forums. Bilateral trade agreements are among 
the tools mentioned to push the agenda forward (European Commisison, 2007: 6).  
When formulating goals for achieving European interests in an age of globalization the 
European Commission expresses its self-interest in promoting its own trade rules and “has an 
obvious stake in defining the rules of global governance in a way that reflects its interests and 
values” (European Commission, 2007a: 3-5), while using political negotiations to ensure that 
the EU can protect its business interests in foreign markets. Shaping global regulation is 
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underlined as a priority and using the EUs experience in developing common regulatory 
regimes is seen as a definitive advantage in this race (European Commission, 2007a: 6).  
The stage has therefore been set for a competition between the EU and other actors to open 
foreign markets and implement rules and standards that comply with domestic regulation, 
thereby preventing any unnecessary obstacles to the expansion of business and production 
networks to other countries. In this global competition the EU obviously prefers if everybody 
adopted the rules in which the EU had developed an expertise over several decades, instead of 
it having to adapt to another framework. It is therefore necessary for it to engage in 
competitive regionalism, where it essentially competes with the US to gain competitive 
advantages brought on by regulatory reform in new markets.  
If there is to be a global set of regulatory standards, and the WTO, as shown, is not up to 
making these standards, then other avenues must be pursued. This is the cause behind the 
resulting competition between the large traders to export their rules and standards, starting 
with bilateral agreements with smaller economies. The Economic Partnership Agreements are 
the first step in this direction. Though the EU sees its own regulatory regime as superior, 
other actors are attempting to pursue the same goals, namely the US and to some degree 
China and Japan. There is therefore a race to get third countries to conform to a certain set of 
standards before others succeed. This is a central goal of the Global Europe free trade 
agreements which thereby continue in the vein of the Economic Partnership Agreements 
presented above.  
The Global Europe Trade Agreements 
At the April meeting of the Council of Ministers for General Affairs and External Relations in 
2007, negotiating mandates were given to the European Commission to start trade agreement 
negotiations with Central American countries19, the Andean Community20, South Korea, the 
ASEAN region and India (EUO, 2007). The first of these negotiations to be concluded was with 
South Korea and the agreement included provisions on both goods and regulatory issues. 
Besides being the first Global Europe trade agreement, it is considered a benchmark for Global 
Europe (UM, 2011: 30; WTO, 2011a: 25). Its contents and scope can therefore serve, along 
                                                        
19 Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama 
20 Bolivia, Ecuador, Colombia, Peru 
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with the EPAs, as an indication of the direction that the EU is moving in with its new true 
trade strategy.  
South Korea 
The South Korea-EU trade agreement is the largest South Korea has entered into, in terms of 
market size, and is larger even than the South Korea-US agreement (Cooper et.al, 2011:1). The 
agreement fulfilled three of the main criteria the EU looks for in a potential Global Europe 
trade agreement partner: 1. There exists significant market potential 2. The removal of 
barriers included in an agreement will lead to sufficient growth opportunities for the EU and 
3. A main competitor has its eye on the same market.  
According to the European Commission, the agreement is the most comprehensive trade 
agreement the EU has ever signed and will remove 98,7% of tariffs over 5 years, while most of 
the remaining tariffs will be removed over a longer transitional period, with the exception of a 
few agricultural products (European Commission, 2010: 6). The agreement includes chapters 
on services, foreign direct investment, competition, intellectual property rights, public 
procurement and not only extends commitments made at the WTO but also covers issues that 
are not yet regulated at the multilateral level (Cooper, 2011: 1).  
A main motivation for the EU to conclude the agreement was that the US had already 
negotiated an agreement with South Korea in 2007, and there was a fear that this would mean 
a loss of market share for European exporters (UM, 2011: 30). The Commission was primarily 
concerned with the fact that the US might be able to create a regulatory advantage for its 
exporters, by getting Korea to adopt regulatory frameworks that provided exclusionary 
benefits to the U.S. (Elsig & Dupont, 2012: 501).  
To underline the significance of the domino effect of free trade agreements it is important to 
note that the U.S. signed its agreement with Korea in June 2007, around the same time the EU 
decided to start negotiations, and the agreement came into force in March 2012 (USTR, 2013).  
Despite the fact that the EU signed its agreement with Korea 3 years later than the US, it was 
able to provisionally apply it a year later, while the US could not implement its agreement 
until March 201221. This is judged to have given the EU a first mover advantage, though it is 
                                                        
21  The agreement was signed in 2007 but approval by congress was delayed due to concerns over tariffs 
imposed by the South Koreans  on US car makers http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-15284813  
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difficult to determine yet precisely how valuable this will be (Cooper et.al, 2011: 1: European 
Commission 2013b; 2; Horng, 2012: 319).  
Liberalization of services and investment was of crucial importance to the EU, and South 
Korea had significant barriers, especially in the services sector, meaning that there were 
substantial gains to be found by the EU in liberalizing this sector (Cooper et.al, 2011: 15). 
South Korea is a significant trading partner for the EU, but European services companies had 
previously encountered problems with market access often relating to standards 
requirements, and so the tackling of this issue was prioritized by the EU (Rydelski & 
Nordgaard, 2012: 432). As mentioned earlier first-mover advantages are significant in the 
services sector as it is determined by large economies of scale and large sunk costs. The 
importance of regulations for the functioning of business in the services sector means that the 
first-mover advantage accrues to those companies and governments that are able to help 
formulate regulations reminiscent of those in their home market. The EU therefore had the 
possibility to allow its firms to gain a dominant position to the detriment of outsiders which 
would be disadvantaged in comparison to the standard setters (Siles-Brugge, 2012: 26).  
As the negotiations started after the US-Korea agreement had been signed, it was important 
for the EU to gain access equivalent to the US. In most areas the EU achieved parity with the 
US while in the areas of legal services, telecommunication, environmental services, transport, 
postal service, building and construction and financial services the EU ensured an agreement 
that was even more preferential than the one negotiated by the US (UM, 2011: 30). It 
therefore seems that that the EU has been able to nullify to some degree the advantages 
obtained by the US negotiating first.    
Though it is too early to determine the effect of the regulatory issues that were included in the 
agreement, after the first year trade has increased between the two partners, sometimes to 
the detriment of other, showing evidence of trade diversion. During the first year the EU’s 
collective exports to Korea increased 37%, and the export of liberalized items increased more 
than items that weren’t liberalized, showing that the increase was not solely due to the 
economic growth of Korea (European Commission 2013b),  
The relationship between the EU and Korea was very asymmetrical from the beginning. Korea 
is very dependent on the EU, for both trade and investment, and also has very high levels of 
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protection in areas that were important to the EU. Furthermore, as was seen with the 
agreement between the US and Singapore, the EU was able to achieve significant 
liberalizations, but conceded very little in the agricultural sector, which is often the sticking 
point in trade negotiations. Though some products, like rice, are excluded from the agreement 
(Cooper et.al, 2011: 13), the general opening of the Korean market is expected to increase 
European agricultural exports (UM, 2011; Horng, 2012), meaning a stumbling block from 
previous trade negotiations at both regional and multilateral level, was not an issue. This gave 
the EU significant leverage in the agreements as it was able to use the position of 
asymmetrical power provided by its large domestic market to induce the kind of regulatory 
reforms and market access needed by its domestic industries to not lose competitiveness in 
relation to American companies.  
When determining how important the ability of the EU to determine negotiating forums and 
agendas is to the success of its trade strategy, it is significant to note that the EU succeeded in 
including issues at the bilateral level which had been blocked at the WTO. With regards to 
services, a sector that represents three quarters of EU GDP and 70% of employment, the EU 
was able to get Korea to go further than its previous commitments at the Doha Development 
Round. Similar results were achieved in the areas of government procurement and IPR 
(Horng, 2012: 310-314). From a EU point of view this serves as evidence of how it can utilize 
the asymmetrical relations present in negotiations with partners ,that have a high level of 
dependence on the EU market, to achieve concessions that it would otherwise not have gotten 
at the multilateral level, where power dynamics were less to the EUs advantage.   
In a study of the effects of the agreement, it was shown that Korea was expected to increase 
its GDP by 0.8% as a result of the agreement, while the EU would only see a growth of 0.08% 
(Decreaux et.al, 2010: 4). It is therefore fair to assume that besides the smaller economic 
benefit of a reduction in duties as well as increased market access, the a main goal for the EU 
has been trading market access to the EU for regulatory influence in Korea, thereby 
continuing the race of competitive regionalism with the U.S.   
Andean Countries 
The next Global Europe trade agreements were with Peru and Colombia. Though the Andean 
Community is not mentioned in Global Europe as strategic priorities, the agreements 
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themselves conform to the structure of Global Europe trade agreements. In this case it is 
reasonable to suspect that the motivation for the EU was not based on the economic potential 
of the agreements, but more of an action to cement a regulatory presence in the subcontinent 
in competitions with the US, which already had agreements with Peru and Colombia. 
Colombia and Peru account for only 0,6% of EU exports, but if the EU succeeds in concluding 
trade agreements with the Andean community, combined with its agreement with Central 
America and ongoing negotiations with Mercosur, it will have achieved significant presence in 
most of South America, an area normally the prerogative of the US (Stevens et.al, 2012: 5).  
The EU had initially wanted, like the U.S., to conduct negotiations with the Andean group as a 
region, but that goal quickly met obstacles. In 2007 Bolivia withdrew from the negotiations in 
protest against EU demands on services and intellectual property and Ecuador left 
negotiations in 2009 over disagreements on a number of similar issues including the EUs 
banana tariffs (ICTSD, 2009; ICTSD, 2009a).  
Colombia and Peru exports already entered the EU tariff free via the EU’s General System of 
Preferences , but they risked losing access in the future review of the scheme and were 
therefore motivated to guarantee their access via trade agreements (Stevens et.al 2012: 5). 
These considerations are similar to the ones of the non-LDC ACP countries which feared the 
poorer alternatives available and therefore were inclined to sign interim-EPAs.  
The final agreements ensures that 80 % trade in industrial goods will be liberalized with Peru, 
and 65 % with Colombia while the agreements go beyond WTO requirements on the issues of 
intellectual property, services and public procurement (European Commission, 2012d; 
Stevens et.al. 2012:23). At the time of signing, the U.S. pointed out that the EU-Colombia 
agreement would provide European companies with first mover advantages over American 
firms (ICTSD, 2011), underlining the importance of first-mover advantages as a rationale for 
regulatory reform abroad, especially in the services sector.  
The EU was the largest market for Peruvian agricultural exports and its second largest export 
market overall while trade with the EU was worth over 14% of total Andean trade in 2010 
(European Commission, 2013a). In the five years prior to the signing of the agreement 
Peruvian exports to the EU had increased 10%, while the agreement was expected to increase 
the GDP of both Colombia and Peru by 1 % (mincetur.gov.pe, 2012). Combined with the threat 
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of losing access in a future reform as well as the fact that Colombia and Peru already had tariff 
free access to the EU so the new agreement posed no new threat to European business 
(Stevens et.al 2012:53), the EU had substantial leverage over the two countries to implement 
its reforms of regulatory issues.  
The conclusion of negotiations to the EUs liking undoubtedly became easier when Bolivia and 
Ecuador left the negotiations. Especially Ecuador’s objection to the EUs lack of 
implementation of the changes to its banana tariffs, as decided by the WTO, could have been a 
substantial sticking point. There is disagreement over who was to blame for the Andean group 
breaking up and not negotiating together as a region, but one point of view is that the EU 
refused to allow the four countries to engage in differentiated approaches to the negotiations 
and therefore forced a break up of an already fragile region (Olivet & Novo, 2011: 3). This 
obviously benefitted the EU in the respect that it allowed negotiations to continue in 
circumstances of more asymmetrical power relations, but on the other makes the creation of a 
larger coherent region to trade with more difficult.  
The agreements between the EU, Peru and Colombia are an open mulit-party trade agreement, 
meaning that Ecuador and Bolivia can be included in them if they should wish to join. Ecuador 
has said that it wants to re-start negotiations on a new trade deal but as regional integration is 
stated goal of the EU, they have encouraged Ecuador to join the already negotiated 
agreements (ICTSD, 2012).  The trade agreements furthermore state that the EU is to try to 
ensure that if Ecuador or Bolivia were to accede to the agreements, that the integrity of the 
agreements are preserved, meaning that very little flexibility is to be offered to the new 
entrants(European Commission, 2011a: art 329). The EU has therefore succeeded in splitting 
up a region so as to negotiate in a relationship of very high asymmetrical dependence, making 
it easier to convert its economic resources into negotiating influence. After the original 
agreement is in place the EU offers the same agreement to the rest of the group, having 
thereby accomplished a significant regulatory encircling of the remaining Andean countries, 
while also counting on the fear of exclusion that leads to a the domino effect. A strategy that it 
is also attempting in Asia.  
It is important to note that the concessions granted to the EU are equal or better than those 
provided to the US, China and Canada. The EU was therefore not only able to get parity, and in 
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the case of China-Peru obtain more ambitious concessions (Stevens et.al.2012:15), it was also 
able to provisionally apply the agreement quicker due to more expedient institutional 
procedures, allowing it to gain an advantage over the U.S. On the tariff side alone US 
companies are at a significant disadvantage, as many of their products enter Colombia at 
tariffs around 10%, while many goods from the EU will enter tariff free, leaving US companies 
at a significant competitive disadvantage in this area alone (USTR, 2013a).  
ASEAN: Malaysia, Vietnam, Thailand, Singapore 
As the trade negotiations with the ASEAN countries are still very new there is little 
information to build on, but it is nevertheless possible to see the contours of the EUs trade 
strategy by looking at the evidence that is available. Negotiating mandates for the EU-ASEAN 
agreement as well as new negotiating directives regarding investment and press reports from 
negotiations provide an understanding of the goals the EU is trying to achieve and the 
methods it uses to achieve them.  
A free trade agreement between the EU and the ASEAN countries was seen as one of the 
primary goals of Global Europe as the area lived up to many of the criteria laid out in the 
strategy. ASEAN was the EUs third largest trading partner after the US and China, and the EU 
is by far the largest investor in the region (European Commission, 2013b). Furthermore, it  
was estimated that the agreement could see ASEAN exports to the EU rise by 18 % while 
collective GDP could increase by 2% by 2020 (Abdullah, 2008). As mentioned previously, the 
US also had an active interest in the region and was conducting both bilateral and regional 
negotiations there, and this undoubtedly motivated the EU as well.  
 The EUs negotiating mandate from 2007 provides insight into its objectives.  Here it is 
acknowledged that the region has significant market potential, and is seen as having achieved 
significant progress in its regional integration as well as becoming a hub for a widening 
network of free trade agreements. The EU fears becoming disadvantaged compared to 
ASEANs other trade agreement partners and it therefore intended to pursue market access 
more aggressively than previously. The EU also saw a possibility to expand its influence on 
the regulatory framework of the region:  
“Furthermore, as these countries continue to develop economically, the impact of 
non-tariff barriers on our trade is growing and the need for a more robust 
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framework to resolve such issues will become even more urgent. The establishment 
of a free trade area provides an additional incentive for ASEAN countries both to 
profit from our experience and identify solutions and approaches which are 
more compatible with those of the EU.” (European Commission, 2007b, my 
enhancement) 
Despite the EU saying it would offer a flexible approach that allowed for different negotiating 
speeds depending on the development level of the different ASEAN countries (Abdullah, 
2008), in 2009 negotiations were suspended because of regional differences and due, 
according to a report written for the Commission, to the “low level of ambition of most ASEAN 
countries” (Ecorys et.al, 2009: xxiv). This could alternatively be understood as the ASEAN 
group being able to collectively prevent the EU from achieving the majority of its individual 
goals. The EU therefore started negotiations with individual members that were ready to 
“negotiate at the appropriate level of ambition”, starting with Singapore (Ecorys et.al.2009). 
Singapore is the EUs largest trading partner in ASEAN and the trade agreement was 
concluded in December 2012. It makes sense that the EU would start with Singapore as it is 
the only country in ASEAN that already had a free trade agreement with the US (ustr. 2013c), 
and therefore a priority for the EU if it was to catch up.  
It is clear that need to turn away from regional negotiations was expected by the EU as the 
ASEAN negotiating mandate included permission for the Commission to conduct bilateral 
negotiations if regional agreements were not progressing as wished (European Commission, 
2007b). The EU had obviously learnt a lesson from its ACP negotiations, where smaller 
nations organized in regions can prevent negotiations from moving forward, but can be split 
up into smaller units that find standing up to the EU much more difficult, given their degree of 
dependence on the EU market and general asymmetry of the relationship. 
The negotiating mandates are also interesting in that they mention very little about the 
asymmetry between the EU and negotiating partners. Though the EU accepts that the ASEAN 
countries have differing levels of development, the only concrete result of this is that the less 
developed countries will be allowed longer transitional periods (European Commission, 
2007b). Usually, when there is mention of asymmetry, there can be talk of the EU carrying the 
brunt of the liberalization as long as substantially all trade between the two is liberated. This 
means that if 90 % of tariffs on trade are to be liberalized, the EU could liberalize 95% and the 
partner 85%, reaching an average of 90% (Maes et.al, 2007: 16). This is not the case here and 
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it therefore seems that the EU is aiming for equal efforts on both sides and therefore little 
regard for the development level of its partners. This was also the case with the EPAs 
presented previously 
 The EU focused its negotiations with Singapore on the liberalization of investment and 
services, especially on the freedom of investment in services. It saw the ability of European 
services firms to be present in foreign markets as not only good for these companies, but also 
as a way to provide necessary inputs for other parts of global value chains, to the benefit of 
both foreign and domestic companies in the partner country (Robles, 2011: 380).  Around the 
time of the negotiations the European Commission received a new negotiating mandate that 
permitted it to pursue more extensive commitments on investments in its negotiations with 
Singapore and India. The new mandate shows the degree to which the EU prioritizes the 
interests of its investors to the detriment of the policy space and independence of the partner 
countries. Far ranging MFN-clauses, rules undermining the ability to use capital controls and 
the implementation of arbitration systems that prioritize companies over governments are 
some of the new goals that the EU pursued (European Commission, 2011c; Ilge & Singh, 2011; 
Van Harten, 2010) 
A few months after the EU opened negotiations with Singapore it did the same with Malaysia, 
then with Vietnam in 2012 and Thailand in 2013. Negotiations on these agreements are still 
ongoing, as are the investment protection negotiations with Singapore based on the new 
mandate. All the negotiations with the separate ASEAN countries are based on the same 
negotiation mandate and so the EU hopes to collate the agreements into a larger ASEAN-EU 
agreement that will be open to those ASEAN countries that have not engaged in negotiations 
(European Commission, 2007b). This is therefore a copy of the regional negotiation strategy 
pursued with the Andean countries and also in the ACP. Agreements are negotiated with small 
partners and then opened up for others to join, but with little flexibility to accommodate the 
needs of the newcomers. It is also important to note that the EU’s ASEAN negotiating partners 
are largely the same countries that the US is negotiating with, either bilaterally or via its 
negotiations in the TransPacific Partnership. Negotiations that the US was conducting 
partially out of fear of being left out of negotiations conducted by, and in, ASEAN. Trade 
negotiations between the region and EU being the most important example.   
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The EU’s strategy is clear. As region to region agreements is still one of the EUs goals, it has 
not abandoned the idea of a creating regions with which to trade, instead of individual 
countries. It pursued it with the Andean countries, with the ACP, and with ASEAN. But it has 
experienced the same problems along the way, where negotiations have not progressed to its 
liking due to the problems with negotiating with larger groups. The EU has therefore engaged 
in a strategy of regulatory encircling using divide and conquer tactics. Though negotiating 
with a region could have been more efficient, when the EU decides that negotiations are not 
going its way it decides to pursue bilateral negotiations with individual countries, creating a 
domino effect among the partner country and its regional neighbors. This makes it 
increasingly difficult for the countries that want to stay out. They must eventually acquiesce 
to the terms of an agreement they have not negotiated if they are to engage in trade with the 
EU on equal terms with their neighbors or engage in any forms of regional regulatory 
integration. The EU takes advantage of its ability to choose the negotiating forum, or in other 
words apply agenda setting power, in which the power asymmetries are largest and then let 
the dynamics of domino effects ensure that relenting partners are drawn in to negotiations.   
India 
India has significant market potential given its market size and levels of protection and so the 
successful negotiation of an agreement with India contained the promise of substantial 
economic benefits for the EU. It therefore pursued a trade agreement that was extensive in its 
liberalization of goods, services and investment and which went further than any 
commitments given previously by the two parties at WTO (Siles Brugge, 2012: 199; EUU, 
2012:12).  
The EU sees India as having a substantial strategic importance (European Commission, 2010: 
11), and the political and economic development and potential of India show why. As has been 
mentioned, India and China have an increasingly influential role in multilateral forums, and 
play a central part in the stale mate at the Doha Round. Furthermore, EU investment in India 
more than tripled between 2003 and 2010, to €3 billion, while trade in commercial services 
also tripled to €17.9 billion (European Commission, 2013c). Trade is expected to double 
towards 2015 if an agreement is signed (Euractiv, 2013) and so the relationship is defined by 
certain degree of mutual interest. But the relationship is also extremely asymmetrical. India’s 
economy is around 6 % of the EU’s and it has a per capita income equal to Nicaragua’s. It has 
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the largest number of poor people of any country in the world, and while the EU constitutes 
20% of Indian trade, trade with India represents only 2% for the EU (Powell, 2010: 3). 
Despite this asymmetry and the fact that India is a developing country, there is no mention of 
it in the EU’s negotiating mandate for its free trade agreement with India (European 
Commission, 2007c). There is no mandate for the European Commission to treat India as a 
developing country, despite the fact that India already receives trading preferences that the 
EU only offers to the poorest and most vulnerable countries (Regulation 978/2012: Annex 1). 
The renewed EU mandate to negotiate investments with Singapore also applied to India and 
therefore contained the same problems of investor protection being prioritized over domestic 
policy space. A problem exacerbated by the fact that India is a less developed economy than 
Singapore and so perhaps less able to adapt to the suggested reforms.    
For India, one of the main goals of the negotiations was achieving concessions from the EU on 
what in WTO parlance is called Mode 4 service. These are services supplied in one partner 
country by a citizen of the other partner country, facilitated by temporary migration. There 
are therefore obvious implications for EU migration policy, making it a sticky point. Though 
the EU said already in 2010 that it would present a strong offer in this area, in 2012 it 
presented a list of extensive demands for further liberalization of Indian services and 
investment before it was willing to live up to those promises (Singh, 2012; EUU, 2012: 12).  
During the course of the trade negotiations the EU has demanded extensive liberalization of 
both goods and services accompanied by extensive investor protection before acquiescing to 
any Indian demands. On the tariff side, the EU expects liberalization of Indian customs duties 
that amount to over $2.4 billion, representing a significant loss of income for the Indian 
government. At the same time the EU has demanded that unless it gets comprehensive 
protection for its 130 Geographical Indications (such as Champagne or Scotch Whiskey), the 
EU will not continue negotiations (Singh, 2012).  
Because of India’s significantly higher tariff levels the EU has demanded they provide most of 
the tariff reductions. India therefore has to reduce a tariff average of 17% to 0% while the EU 
has to decrease from 2% to 0%. And as India is much more dependent on trade with the EU 
than vice versa, this will have more widely felt effects in India (Powell, 2010: 11). The 
negotiating mandate for investment also explicitly avoids allowing for regulatory actions that 
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a partner government might use for the purpose of pursuing industrial policy or national 
development strategies (European Commission, 2011d). This seriously limits the domestic 
policy space of partner countries and is in direct contradiction to proposals from the 
European Parliament that underlined the rights of governments to conduct public 
intervention (Ilge & Singh, 2011; European Parliament, 2012a). 
The EU obviously loses one of its negotiating tools when the partner is not a region consisting 
of smaller countries. For ASEAN and the Andean countries the EU decided to split the group so 
as to facilitate negotiations, but that was not possible with India. There are no smaller 
elements that India can be split into, and so the EU was without that ability to create 
negotiating forums with wider power asymmetries. Also, India was the only one of the 
partners that was seen by the EU as an emerging power and therefore the asymmetries in the 
relationship were less obvious, though still quite large. The negotiations are conducted 
simultaneously with the US pushing forward its negotiations of a bilateral investment treaty 
with India (Business Standard, 2012) and so it makes sense for the EU to keep pushing in an 
attempt to finish the agreement first. More so in India than in other cases it is important for 
the EU to gain first mover advantages in the service sector of such a large market, and 
therefore the EU keeps an eye on the progress of US’ negotiations (Siles Brugge, 2012: 202).  
In the years after the formulation of Global Europe the EU has succeeded in negotiating a 
number of free trade agreements with the emerging markets prioritized in the strategy. It has 
succeeded in negotiating rules for regulatory reform important to European business and has 
also succeeded in reaching many of the markets before the US.  Where this was not the case it 
has often achieved some degree of parity, minimizing the advantages achieved by the US.  
But it is also clear that the EU has often run into problems in negotiations, especially when the 
partners have been developing countries regions. In both the EPA negotiations and the Global 
Europe negotiations in Latin America and Asia, the EU has seen it necessary to abandon 
negotiations with regions, and instead engage in bilateral negotiations with individual 
countries. It has in some cases been unable to translate the large power asymmetries between 
itself and foreign regions into satisfactory results, underlining the need for these asymmetries 
to be especially large, before they can deliver the kind of results that are satisfactory to the 
EU.  It may also be a sign, that though the EU sees liberalization and increased competition as 
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tools to achieve growth, even for its partners, this view is not shared by everyone, and that it 
is often the more developed partners that subscribe to the same notions and accept the 
proposed regulatory reforms. Developing countries are more doubtful of the benefits of 
opening markets to European competitors and are therefore more hesitant to include 
domestic changes that are seen to limit their ability to conduct national industrial policy 
(Kelsey, 2010; Soludo, 2012) 
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7. Conclusion 
The point of this thesis has been to find and understand the causes behind the main strategic 
changes to EU trade policy formulated in Global Europe. Historically, the WTO has been a 
central forum for the EUs pursuit of its trade interests, but this situation started to change 
towards the end of the 20th century because of a number of shifts in the global political 
economy, which became systemic drivers of EU trade policy. The most important of these 
were the strategic shifts in trade policy of the EU’s main competitor, the United States, and the 
increased economic and political power of emerging economies, specifically India and China. 
The EU reacted to these changes with the formulation of Global Europe. Though the strategy 
underlines the need to pursue trade policy through both multilateral and bilateral means, in 
practice, the EU has focused on protecting its interests via bilateral free trade negotiations, as 
it was here that negotiating conditions provided the highest possibility of the EU achieving its 
goals.  The strategy also underlined the need to focus on protecting and promoting those 
issues that could strengthen the EU’s position in the global economy in the face of competition 
from traditional competitors such as the US, and emerging powers like China and India.  A 
central goal was therefore to get other countries to exceed the commitments they had given at 
the WTO in the areas of services liberalization and protection of intellectual property and 
investment.  
The EU included these issues in its trade negotiations, pursuing the same goals in developing 
and industrialized countries alike. In many of the ACP countries this met with opposition, as 
the premise of development resulting  from allowing unfettered access to European 
businesses to the detriment of domestic policy space, was not accepted. The EU met with 
similar opposition in East Asia, where it was competing with the additional challenge of the 
U.S. also trying to export its regulatory frameworks to the most promising new markets and 
therefore gain first mover advantages over its European competitor.  
Especially in services, there are large benefits to be had for those actors that can ensure the 
same regulatory frameworks in foreign markets, as used in their domestic markets. There is 
therefore a race between the most developed economies to define and impose regulatory 
reform in those foreign markets in which they wish to expand their economic activities.  
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In order to circumvent the difficulties accompanying negotiations with regional groupings the 
EU has often chosen to negotiate with countries individually. The EU is often able to use its 
position as the least dependent actor to choose the negotiating forum and therefore also 
create situations where large power asymmetries can be exploited. Though this strategy has 
often helped the EU push negotiations forward, its success has also been limited. Only 
negotiations with other more developed economies, like South Korea and Singapore, have 
been completed within the desired time frame. Negotiations with developing countries often 
drag on, as the large asymmetries between the partners, are not enough to bridge the gap in 
interests that often underlay trade negotiations. Especially the availability of alternative 
market access instruments, such as the EUs GSP and EBA, prevent the EU from effectively 
converting its control over access to its market into influence in its negotiations with 
developing countries.  
Nevertheless, despite obstacles, the EU has succeeded in achieving progress in negotiations on 
the issues that it prioritizes the most. It has undoubtedly achieved more on the bilateral level 
than it could at Doha, and has therefore to a certain degree legitimized its strategic choice of 
changing negotiating forums so as to more effectively convert its market resources into 
economic power.   
With regards to the theoretical and methodological choices made in this thesis, it has been 
shown that, specifically in the area of trade policy, the EU is increasingly acting like a state and 
that theories taken from international political economy which focus on the actions of states, 
can therefore justifiably be used to understand its actions and motivations. Instead of looking 
at the internal dynamics of the EU, and the interaction between member states and 
institutions, it is instead increasingly useful to look at external drivers to understand the EU’s 
actions. This is primarily due to the increased political and administrative centralization of 
trade policy that has seen political power in trade policy mainly reside within the 
Commission. Though Member States still have influence via the Council of Ministers and the 
European Parliament has seen its trade power increase after the Lisbon Treaty, their 
influence can not sufficiently describe the changes described in this thesis.  
This allows the study of EU trade policy to be more firmly placed within the field of 
International Political Economy and therefore opens up the possibility of using a wide range 
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of theories, which were previously reserved for analyzing nation states. Variables that were 
previously disregarded as determinants of EU policy can therefore be included in future 
analysis and hopefully contribute to deeper and more compelling explanations of the EUs 
behavior in the global political economy.  
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